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Triangulating Constitutional Theory:
Power, Time, and Everyman
PHILIP C. KISSAMt
I. INTRODUCTION

American constitutional law contemplates three basic
values: the exercise of power by both government and
private actors;1 the commitment of our nation to a written
constitution and a process of judicial review that involves
respecting, interpreting, and applying decisions of prior
generations in order to provide structure and insight to current government policies; 2 and the commitment of our
nation to a democracy that takes account of the values and
interests of all individuals in the face of inevitable political
conflicts about these values and interests. 3 Modern
constitutional law and constitutional theory reflect these
values in varying degrees. This article argues that understanding and elaborating the three fundamental values of
constitutional law can generate a meta-theory, or synthesis
of theory, against which particular theories of constitutional
law can and should be measured.
These three values of power, time and everyman are or
should be in constant tension, interdependence and balance

t Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. My colleagues Rick
Levy and Tom Stacy made helpful comments on a draft of this article, and
Andrew Marino provided excellent research assistance.
1. For example, the first three Articles of the Constitution define the
legislative, executive and judicial powers of the national government, and many
provisions, most prominently the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment,
impose limits upon the powers of government by recognizing private rights and
power.
2. See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL

SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001).

3. See, e.g.,

CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT

(2001); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L. J. 1493 (1988).
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with each other in arguing, deciding and justifying important constitutional cases. Sometimes these values support
each other and at other times they will be in conflict or
competition. The prominence of these values is justified on
two grounds. First, each value is embedded in the practice
of constitutional law. The values thus fit and help explain
constitutional law and, at some level of abstraction, they
constitute "points of agreement" within American legal
culture upon which constitutional theory and law can be
constructed. 4 Secondly, these three values, suitably elaborated, help justify constitutional law as a matter of democratic theory. Constitutional law that is grounded in these
values supports an attractive conception of representative
democracy that 5 respects and promotes the flourishing of
individual lives.
The general nature and implications of these fundamental values may be outlined preliminarily as follows. The
value of power concerns sensitivity to the exercise of power
by government agencies, for the constitution's first purpose
was to establish and empower three branches of a new national government and relate this new government to state
governments. Power also concerns sensitivity to our ideas
about limited government, including appropriate restraints
upon the judicial power and state governments, for the
original constitution and Bill of Rights were intended to
create a national government of "limited powers" and the
Civil War Amendments, especially the Fourteenth
Amendment, may be viewed similarly as limiting the powers of state governments. 6 The consideration of power must
also be sensitive to relationships between public power and
private power, for the flip side or consequence of limited
government power is the exercise of private power, and
surely justifiable limits on government power should consider the consequences of expansive, unregulated private
powers. These different aspects of constitutional power, of

4. See David Strauss, What is Constitutional Theory?, 87 CAL. L. REV. 581,
583-86 (1999).

5. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87
CAL. L. REV. 535 (1999) (constitutional theories should be judged based on their
capacity to promote democracy, maintain the rule of law, and protect morally
and politically acceptable substantive rights).
6. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 147-56 (1982).
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course, raise complicated questions of interpretation and
constitutional theory, especially because the references to
powers in the constitutional text are abstract or open-ended
and because the different powers at stake are often in competition with each other or with other constitutional values.
The differences among constitutional theories thus begin
with disagreements about how to interpret and apply the
multi-faceted and ambiguous nature of constitutional
powers.
The value of time or history in constitutional law is
similarly multi-faceted and ambiguous. This value, when
considered to its fullest extent, requires sensitivity to the
constitutional text and its historical contexts, to precedents,
to other government practices and their historical contexts,
and, most broadly, to other constitutionally relevant institutions and practices that are "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition.' 7 While the value of time
looks forward to the possible consequences of judicial decisions, the primary commitment of this value is to establishing
well-founded
connections
between
new
constitutional decisions and decisions by prior generations
of Americans that provide light or wisdom for the resolution
of current issues. Constitutional theories differ in important
ways in the treatment of time.
The constitutional value of everyman demands sensitivity to universal human rights but also demands more
than this, for universal rights in constitutional law might
easily be limited to rights that have been established by
some exercise of the majority will-either in the writing of
the constitutional text (for example, rights to free speech
and the free exercise of religion) or in adopting constitutionally valid legislation that creates statutory rights (for
example, civil rights). Limiting the rights of everyman to
only those favored in some sense by "a majority" can leave
individuals and groups outside the realm of democratic

7. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); see also
BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 25-58, 93-119 (discussing textual and doctrinal
arguments as well as "ethical" arguments that are based on the American
"constitutional ethos"); RUBENFELD, supra note 2 (on the importance of our
written constitution that is embedded in American history); David A. Strauss,
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation,63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996) (on
the importance of text, Framers' intent and precedent to constitutional law).
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government, especially individuals and groups whose rights
and interests are politically unpopular or too small in scale
to attract the attention of legislative bodies.8 Moreover,
such a limited notion of rights fails to justify much of constitutional law that is aimed at protecting racial minorities,
women, and homosexuals from unreasonably restrictive or
oppressive legislation. 9 The constitutional value of everyman, then, requires sensitivity to and respect for the
human dignity of all individuals, and this value pays special attention to human interests and values that are likely
to be unfairly discounted or dismissed by legislative and
other kinds of majoritarian processes. Needless to say, constitutional theories divide significantly in their treatment of
this value.
It may be noted that other significant values, especially
those of liberty rights, the separation-of-powers and federalism, are subsumed within the three basic values that
have just been outlined. Many liberty rights of individuals
are included within the everyman value, and other liberty
rights-of both individuals and organizations-are derived
from the consideration of limited government powers and
consequent recognition of private powers. More obviously,
separation of powers issues and questions of federalism, or
the allocation of power between national and state governments, are subsumed within the power value, although this
does not mean that such constitutional issues involve only
power-the values of time and everyman are and should be
present in the decision of these issues as well.
Today there are diverse theories of how constitutional
law should be interpreted and constitutional issues resolved
by the courts. There has been a proliferation of constitutional theories in the past two decades, and they offer
judges a broad range of choices. Among the prominent
theories are the different originalist theories of Antonin

8. See, e.g., EISGRUBER, supra note 3; LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR
UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL

REVIEW (2001); Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy:
What Role for the Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635 (2003) [hereinafter

Perry, ProtectingHuman Rights].
9. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
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Scalia' 0 and Robert Bork," the pragmatic approach of Richard Posner, 12 the case-by-case or common law approaches of
Cass Sunstein 13 and David Strauss, 14 John Hart Ely's
"representation-reinforcing" theory,' 5 the "moral theories"
of Michael Perry, 16 Ronald Dworkin, 17 and Christopher
Eisgruber,' 8 to say nothing of the theories, most from the
"Yale School" of constitutional law, that might be described
as "complex originalist" theories.19 In view of this variety,
choose among competing
how should one organize and
20
theories of constitutional law?

10. See, e.g., ANTONIN J. SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997);

Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849 (1989)
[hereinafter Scalia, Originalism].
11. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral
Principles].
12. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 57-96 (2003);
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 1-29, 171-255, 387-405 (1995); Richard A.
Posner, PragmaticAdjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1996); see also Daniel A.
Farber, Legal Pragmatismand the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
13. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999).
14. See Strauss, supranote 7.
15. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).

16. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (1982); Perry, ProtectingHuman Rights, supra note 8.
17. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
18. See EISGRUBER, supra note 3.
19. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE, FOUNDATIONS (1991);
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998);

RUBENFELD, supra note 2; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,71 TEX. L.
REV. 1165 (1993); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORD. L. REV.
1365 (1997).

20. See also Fallon, supra note 5. Professor Fallon provides "a framework

within which readers can determine how various constitutional theories should
be assessed in light of their own views about the rule of law, political
democracy, and the individual rights necessary for substantive justice." Id. at
551 (emphasis in original). Fallon however does not "attempt... to advance
substantive arguments about the best understanding of the rule of law, political
democracy, or individual rights." Id. But cf. Richard A. Posner, Against
Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998) (arguing that modern
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This article has five sections. Each of the first three
sections elaborates one of the basic values or dimensions of
American constitutional -law. In the aggregate, the analysis
in these sections develops a meta-theory or synthesis of
theory about how constitutional law does or should
function. The fourth section assesses prominent contemporary theories of constitutional law in light of this meta-theory. This assessment reveals that some influential theories
of constitutional law are concerned primarily or exclusively
with power; that there are also two-dimensional theories
which take seriously either power and time or power and
everyman; and that other constitutional theories deal in
significant ways with all three fundamental dimensions:
power, time and everyman. The final section of this article
provides several reasons for choosing a theory of constitutional law that is grounded in all three values.
II. POWER
Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It
of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the
is the core
21
world.

All theories of constitutional law recognize the value of
power. But there are two sources of major disagreement
among the theories. The general, abstract and open-ended
provisions in the constitutional text that refer or allude to
power create many opportunities for interpretive disagreements about the substantive meaning of particular provisions and about the nature of the judicial role, or judicial
power, in making these interpretations. These two opportu-

constitutional theory is not helpful to lawyers and especially to judges who
must decide actual cases). This article has some similar qualities to Professor
Fallon's article, but this article unlike his focuses on practice-based values in
constitutional law and advances reasons for choosing and developing a
particular kind of constitutional theory which is both grounded in and supports
a conception of democracy that has substantive implications, not merely
procedural implications, for constitutional law. Cf. IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRACY'S
PLACE 238 (1996) ('More than process, less than substance might be an
appropriate slogan" for a conception of democratic justice that entails both
collective self-rule and opposition to unjustifiable hierarchies).
21. Jeffrey C. Isaac, Ends, Means, and Politics, in DISSENT 32, 35 (Spring
2002).
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nities, in turn, invite constitutional theorists to take
substantially different positions on the significance of time
and everyman as equivalent constitutional values. This section of the article surveys the sources of theoretical disagreement about power, leaving the specification of differences among theories to section four of the article.
Article I of the United States Constitution vests "all
legislative Powers" in the Congress; section 8 then provides
a list of Congress' powers, which include several abstract or
open-ended powers such as the power "to regulate Commerce ...

among the several States" and, in paragraph 18,

the power "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States. '22 Article II vests "the executive Power" in the President, and defines this power in
certain open-ended terms, most particularly that "he shall
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. ' 23 Article
III vests "the judicial Power" in the Supreme Court and
such lower courts as Congress chooses to establish, and section 2 defines the "Judicial Power" to "extend to" a variety
of "Cases" and "Controversies," including "all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority. ' 24 Article VI and the Tenth Amendment recognize state government powers in general and
their relationship to national powers. Article VI declares
the supremacy of the constitution, federal statutes adopted
''pursuant to the constitution" and treaties "adopted under
the constitution" over state law, 25 and the Tenth Amendment's states that "powers not delegated to the national
constitution are reserved to the States
government by the
'26
and their people.
The constitutional text's recognition of government
powers has always been understood to create a national

22. U.S. CONST., art. I,
23. Id. at art. II, § 3.
24. Id. at art. III, § 2.
25. Id. at art. VI.
26. Id. at amend. X.

§ 8.
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government of "enumerated" or "limited" powers. 27 Other

provisions in the text, most prominently those in the Bill of
Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, expressly limit the
powers of both the national and state governments by
creating rights for persons or citizens and (by interpretation) organizations. 28 Thus when American courts interpret
the constitutional powers of government and constitutional
rights that limit these powers, they must engage with complex questions about the appropriate exercise of power by
both public and private agencies. Moreover, in this engagement judges necessarily confront a basic threshold
question. The conflict of powers, between national and state
governments, between the legislative or executive power
and the judicial power, and between public and private
power, would seem on first impression to invite political
judgments or political answers. But judges appear to be a
special kind of political animal, neither trained nor particularly authorized to make straightforward political
judgments about these conflicts. What role, in other words,
should time, history and everyman play in making judicial
decisions about these conflicts-that is the stuff of constitutional theory, or so shall I argue in the rest of this article.
The presence of power in constitutional law is recognized by the constitutional text in another significant way
as well. The President "by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate" is given the power to appoint federal
judges. 29 This divided or shared power of appointment
introduces considerations of power and politics into the
selection of federal judges. Presidents often nominate
judges, especially Supreme Court Justices, because of their
particular interpretive theories or constitutional ideology,
or as a reward to political constituencies, or in return for
27. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819).
28. See, e.g., the First Amendment ("Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech); the Fourth Amendment ("The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against

unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated"); the Fourteenth
Amendment ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws").
29. See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("The President... shall nominate, and
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint... Judges of
the supreme Court, and all other Officers ... ").
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political favors provided by the nominee. 30 The Senate must
then confirm or reject a President's nominees, and Senators
typically act on the basis of partisan political factors such
as a nominee's judicial theory or ideology or their views
about how best to obtain favor with the31electorate by supporting or resisting particular nominees.
This nomination and confirmation process, to be sure, is
infused by a rhetoric (which often may be sincerely motivated) claiming that the President and Senators only wish
to appoint "the best qualified" legal or judicial "experts" as
federal judges, implying that the appointment process is
based on some sort of politically neutral criteria of legal
merit that are beyond politics and power. But the political
nature of judicial appointments and constitutional law
guarantees that ideas of political power, of how government
should operate, will influence the appointment of judges
and their interpretations of constitutional law, at least
tacitly if not expressly. Furthermore, having obtained their
positions as a matter of political power, it should not be
surprising if many or most judges quietly view their roles,
at least in part, as the exercise of political power, and that
most or all judges would be influenced, at least tacitly, by
ideas of political32power when they engage in constitutional
decisionmaking.
Judges, of course, like the politicians who appoint them,
tend to talk about their commitment to "the rule of law" and
deciding cases "only in accordance with the law. ' 33 Moreover, constitutional opinions are written in the language of
conventional legal argument about the meaning of the constitutional text, any evidence of Framers' intent and the

30. See DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999).
31. See TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 90 (1999)

("The consensus remains.., that Senate confirmation voting is primarily
determined by political factors."); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS
HONORABLE COURT: HOW THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR
HISTORY (1985).

32. See, e.g., PERETTI, supra note 31, at 12-73; SEIDMAN, supra note 8. See
generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE) (1999)
(arguing that political ideology plays a significant role in judging).
33. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1175 (1989).

278

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

precedents, and this language is quite consistent with the
rule of law idea and apparent absence of politics. But such
beliefs and practices do not preclude the integration of political power or political ideology with constitutional interpretation. The rule of law concept is an abstract, openended "essentially contested concept" that generates diver34
gent or competing conceptions of what "the law" requires,
and in hard cases persuasive arguments from constitutional
authorities can usually be constructed on both sides of any
difficult constitutional issue. 35 In addition, appellate judges
must often interpret complicated factual situations, especially the "legislative facts" that pertain to constitutional issues, and these factual interpretations can diverge in ways
that influence different judicial interpretations of legal
rules. 36 Thus conflicting legal and factual interpretations
create plenty of room for political factors to enter judging,
either tacitly or consciously, as judges interpret complex
constitutional authorities and apply these authorities to
complex or ambiguous factual situations. 37 Some judges go
further and declare their theories of constitutional interpretation, 38 and any choice of a theory of interpretation,

34. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 'The Rule of Law" as a Concept in
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997); Jeremy Waldron, Is the
Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?,21 LAW & PHIL. 137
(2002).
35. See, e.g., Philip C. Kissam, Explaining Constitutional Law Publicly or,
Everyman's Constitution, 71 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2002) (exploring competing
arguments from constitutional authorities on issues involving the regulation of
cigarette advertising, the regulation of guns and the regulation of abortions).
36. See KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 86-108 (1988); cf. Philip C.

Kissam, Aesthetics of the Cross: Competing Interpretationsof the Ku Klux Klan
Cross in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 5 Kan. J. LAW &
PUB. POL'Y 37 (Spring 1996) (applying Scheppele's concept of "the mutual
construction of facts and rules" to the contrasting opinions of Justices Scalia
and Ginsburg in a particular case).
37. See, e.g., Kissam, supra note 35, at 100-01 (describing interpretive
choices in Roe v. Wade), 103-05 (describing interpretive choices related to free
speech and tobacco advertising regulations), 113-14 (describing interpretive
choices related to the Second Amendment's "right to guns"). See also KENNEDY,
supra note 32.
38. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986), overruled by
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Justice White's opinion for the Court
that rests on an originalist theory about interpreting the constitutional text,
Framers' intent and precedents); Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245 (2002) (arguing that a contextual approach to
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whether explicit or tacit, is surely an act of both law and
politics. And constitutional theories can govern judicial decisions, or at least these theories can justify particular ways
in which an important part of our government, the judicial
should function in making and justifying its decibranch,
sions. 39
The political process by which federal judges are
appointed has yet another important implication for constitutional law. The political process for the appointment of
judges appears to constitute the judge as some kind of
"representative of the people," different from, to be sure, but
not totally unlike representatives who are elected by popular voting. Judges are only selected by the people indirectly,
and they are not politically accountable in the sense that
they cannot be removed by subsequent elections. But
federal judges obtain political authorization from the
appointment process to represent the people, or the people's
law, by making legal decisions in accordance with appointing politicians' views about how such decisions should be
made. 40 At the same time, federal judges, who are always
lawyers and who are insulated from immediate political
pressures by life-time appointments, may be viewed as
representatives of the prior generations of American people
by means of their judicial interpretations of the constitutional text, Framers' intent, precedents, historical contexts
and constitutional ethos. 41 Judges, then, may be characterized as politically authorized representatives of our
constitutional decisionmaking is the best approach to constitutional law);
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, supra note 10 (arguing that an originalist
theory of constitutional interpretation is the best approach to constitutional
law).
39. On whether theory can govern specific constitutional decisions, compare
Strauss, supra note 4 (arguing that theory can govern or influence
constitutional decisions), with Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional
Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 593 (1999) (arguing that judges and scholars choose
their theories to fit and justify the results they want, not vice versa). Professor
Dorf, however, does not seem to deny that theories chosen to fit particular
results may influence a judge's decisionmaking in the future, at least if a judge
wishes to be consistent in her decisionmaking and justifications. Furthermore,
even if theory does not govern judicial decisions, theory at least can serve the
function of justifying different judicial approaches to constitutional law that
may be taken for other reasons. See infra Part IV.
40. See EISGRUBER, supra note 3, at 64-66; PERETTI, supra note 31, at 84-85.
41. See BOBBITT, supra note 6; RUBENFELD, supra note 2.
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country's foundational history and law, and not merely as
representatives of the current political majorities that have
selected them. In this light, federal judges have "democratic
legitimacy" that authorizes them to impose constitutional
constraints on other branches of government.
This representative role of federal judges may also implicate the values of morality and everyman in addition to
power and time. It seems relevant, from both an originalist
point of view and otherwise, that James Madison believed
that a great virtue of the "extended" or "enlarged" republic
created by the American constitution would be a "filtering"
of the public's immediate political desires by several
indirect processes for selecting many important public
officials: U.S. Senators, who originally were selected by
state legislators, the President, who still is selected by the
electors of the electoral college or, failing a majority, the
House of Representatives, and federal judges as well. This
filtering process, Madison believed, would "refine and
enlarge the public views" or "public voice" about the
common good. 42 In this Madisonian perspective, we might
say that federal judges are selected to represent "the
people's law" or "the public's law" of the constitution in a
way that promotes the common good as a value that is
independent of immediate political desires of the majority
will. This "common good," in turn, might be defined either
by a utilitarian calculus of the greatest good for the greatest
number, or by applying the moral values or moral principles of everyman. This is another choice for constitutional
theory.
In sum, if judges are representatives of the people, the
question of how they should represent the people is fundamental to constitutional law. Are judges in constitutional
law expected to use only the same conventional tools of
legal reasoning that they use in statutory law and common
law decisionmaking? Or alternatively, should judges incorporate aspects of politics, of the common good, of the people's fundamental interests or values, into interpretations
of constitutional law and, if so, what aspects should be
incorporated and how should they be incorporated? Should
such values be integrated with, or substituted for, the con42. See THE FEDERALIST No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 10, 39 (James
Madison); GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 223-28 (1982).
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ventional forms of legal reasoning? If judges are representatives of the American people, questions like these are fundamental to the judge's role in constitutional law and
constitutional theory is the field in which these questions
are openly addressed.
Beyond the constitutional text, judges are engaged in
the exercise of power in other significant ways. In justifying
decisions and writing precedents to govern subsequent decisions, judges have the power to choose between relatively
fact specific justifications, general but relatively concrete
rules, and more open-ended standards like balancing tests,
principles or other constitutional standards that invite an
implicit weighing of the circumstances in new cases. 43 At
least Supreme Court Justices, if not other judges, also have
the power to articulate in opinions or otherwise their own
theories of how constitutional law should be interpreted
and applied, 44 and we have seen that such theories
necessarily integrate law and politics. 45 If, then, American
judges must engage with the exercise of power in these
several ways, how should individual judges choose their
theories of constitutional interpretation and decisionmaking? How should a judge choose to act as "a representative
of the people?" These are the basic questions to be considered in this article.
III. TIME
Constitutional theory is the discipline that reflects upon the
the idea of self-government and the problem of
relation between
6
temporality.

4

The American constitution is embedded in time, or history, in complex and important ways. This grounding of
constitutional law in time or the ongoing flow of history invites if not demands that past constitutional practices and

43. See, e.g., Kathleen Sullivan, Foreward: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
44. See, e.g., supra note 38 and accompanying text.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 30-39.
46. PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY:
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 210 (1992).

SELF-GOVERNMENT

IN
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traditions of our government and society be interpreted by
judges as a basis for justifying constitutional decisions. The
commitment to time, however, is treated quite differently
by different theories of constitutional law; for example, the
commitment to time may be treated as defeasible 47 or defined narrowly, perhaps as a commitment only to the
framing of the constitutional text and any long-standing
precedents that are consistent with the clear meaning of the
text or Framers' intent about such meaning. 48 This section
of the article surveys the ways in which constitutional law
is embedded in time and argues as a matter of both practice
and democracy for an expansive commitment to the value of
time, a commitment that establishes a countervailing check
on the mere exercise of power and a basis for recognizing
the values of everyman in a way that transcends the mere
conflict of contemporary values.
Consider first the specific provisions or rules in the
constitutional text, for example, those that establish rules
for constituting and operating the three branches of the national government, those that require juries in federal
criminal and civil proceedings, and the Supremacy Clause's
mandate that valid federal law invalidates conflicting state
laws. 49 Our nation's acceptance and application of these
rules over time have been necessary to establish a50 stable
and productive form of representative democracy. Similarly, the regular practice and acceptance of the power of
judicial review over time have established judicial review as
an essential part of American government even though the
constitutional text does not expressly authorize this
52
power. 51 The Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore
illustrates these historical dimensions of constitutional law,
first by the concerns expressed before the decision that the
47. See supra text accompanying notes 144-51 (describing open-ended
pragmatism).
48. See supra text accompanying notes 119-43 (describing strict originalist
theories).
49. See U.S. CONST., art. I, II, Ill, VI § 2, amend. V, VI & VII.
50. See RUBENFELD, supra note 2, at 11-12, 74-87.

51. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (justifying the power of
judicial review on the basis of political principles); Farber, supra note 12, at
1347-48 (on the acceptance of judicial review as a matter of practice).
52. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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constitution might not provide an effective process for
electing the next President, and then by the widespread
public and professional acceptance of (if not agreement
with) the Supreme Court's decision, which resolved the
uncertainty and provided for the timely selection of a new
President.
Consider next the abstract provisions or rules in the
constitutional text, those that state powers of the different
branches of government and the rights that limit American
governments. 53 These provisions are also embedded in time,
in the historical process, especially if we attend to the
''semantic intentions" of the Framers instead of their
"political intentions." 54 Abstract terms like "commerce ...
among the several States," "freedom of speech," and "equal
protection of the laws" require interpretation if they are to
provide justification for specific constitutional decisions,
and if the Framers gave us these abstract provisions, they
must have intended future generations of Americans to use
time or history to interpret and apply these provisions to
the new situations that would occur over time. What else
could the Framers' use of abstract language, of concepts
that yield different conceptions, have signified? 55
Originalists, by contrast, want to interpret and thus
constrain abstract provisions in the constitutional text by
means of the Framers' "clear" or "specific" political intentions for these provisions. 56 This approach runs into significant problems. First, it is anti-time in the sense that this
approach essentially forecloses consideration of our country's history between the time the constitutional text was
adopted and the current issues to be resolved. Originalism
thus ignores many precedents interpreting the constitution

53. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
54. See Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism,
Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 FORD. L. REV. 1249, 1252-56 (1997).
55. See id.
56. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977) (interpreting
the meaning of "equal protection" by relying on specific intentions of Framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment concerning the legality of segregated public
schools); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, supra
note 11 (searching for "clear, specific" evidence of the Framers' intent about the
nature and protection of free speech rights and finding only an intent to protect
political speech that advocates legal change).
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that have given specific meanings to abstract concepts
expressed in the constitutional text, changes in the conceptual thinking of American society and the legal profession,
and the evolving traditions of American government and
society. The use of the Framers' political intentions by
originalists attempts to freeze constitutional law, not to
interpret constitutional law, and to limit the authority of
judicial review to the exercise of power by the Framers.
Importantly, this approach privileges present time over past
time because originalism's search for the "clear" or "specific"
political values of the Framers tends to minimize constitu57
tional limits upon the actions of the present government.
Secondly, originalism runs into notorious analytical
difficulties when it searches for original meaning in terms
of either the textual language of the constitution or external
evidence of the Framers' intent. These difficulties include:
trying to determine the "clear" or "plain" meaning of abstract constitutional terms; who the authoritative Framers
are (should they be the proposers or ratifiers of the constitutional text, or the "electorate" or "people" as a whole who
selected the ratifiers by sending them to ratifying conventions or ratifying legislatures?); what a collective assembly
of persons intended when there was no vote on a question of
specific intent and only a few members of the collective may
have expressed specific opinions; and what the Framers
"interpretive intent" was or, in other words, what interpretive methods the 58Framers intended for the practice of
constitutional law.
If we turn, however, to the semantic intentions of the
Framers and take seriously the language they provided by
majority or supra-majority votes, several methods of intersuggest
provisions
constitutional
abstract
preting
are
embedthemselves, and at least two of these methods
ded quite fully in time or the historical process. As Jed
Rubenfeld argues, one may take "paradigm cases" that the
Framers were obviously concerned about and argue from
them by analogy and distinction to new instant cases in
order to translate abstract constitutional language into

57. See RUBENFELD, supra note 2, at 45-73.
58. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misperceived Quest for the Original
Understanding,60 B.U. L. REv. 204 (1980).
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more specific meanings. A simple instance of this method
would take the Framers' intent to permit Congress to
regulate ships in interstate commerce and, by analogy,
permit Congress to regulate internet sales. A more difficult
and controversial instance of this reasoning would take the
paradigm of official discrimination against blacks, which
informed the adoption of the equal protection clause, and
apply this paradigm by analogy, or distinction, to the
action policies
contested constitutional issue of affirmative
59
under the equal protection clause.
Another historical method for interpreting abstract
constitutional provisions would be to search for the best
general purposes or principles that may reasonably be said
to underlie, explain and justify the textual provision in
question, any related textual provisions, and any relevant
precedents that have interpreted these provisions, and to
use these "moral/legal" purposes or principles to give
60
concrete meaning to the constitution in particular cases.
These purposes or principles may be "discovered" in
evidence of Framers' intent or the rationales of prior cases,
but they also may be "constructed" as a matter of the most
plausible or best justification of relevant constitutional provisions and precedents. 61 Under this method, for example,
Justice Douglas' famous or infamous "penumbras" rationale
for recognizing a fundamental constitutional right of
privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut62 may be understood as
constructing a general principle of privacy that best justifies not only several provisions in the Bill of Rights 63 but
also a group of seemingly disparate precedents decided

59. See RUBENFELD, supra note 2, at 178-95, 201-20.
60. See generally DWORKIN LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 17 (arguing that legal
reasoning is an exercise in constructive interpretation); Dworkin, Hard Cases,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975) (arguing that judicial decisions not clearly
dictated by statute or precedent should be based on principle); see also Brest,
supra note 58, at 204-24 (describing a theory of "Moderate Originalism" that
relies on general purposes or values to help interpret the abstract provisions of
the constitutional text).
61. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 17, at 45-73, 176-275.
62. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
63. For example, the First Amendment (rights to religion and speech); the
Third Amendment (rights against the quartering of soldiers in houses); and the
Fourth Amendment (the right against unreasonable searches).
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under the Fourteenth Amendment that recognized the constitutional rights to educate one's children in foreign languages, 64 to send one's children to private schools, 65 and to
avoid compulsory sterilization for criminal activity without
compelling
evidence of a genetic basis for criminal activity. 66 As another example, apply this method to affirmative
action. Is the fundamental moral/legal principle underlying
the Fourteenth Amendment and relevant equal protection
cases (1) a principle against caste legislation, which would
not prohibit genuine affirmative action policies, or (2) a
"color-blind" principle against the public use of any racial
classifications,
which would ban all affirmative action
67
programs?
The method of embedded principles is relatively inclusive, for it incorporates not only Jed Rubenfeld's paradigm
method 68 but also other forms of constitutional argument,
even including the political intentions of the Framers.
Originalists wish to treat the clear, specific political intentions of the Framers as dispositive of constitutional issues,
but within the method of embedded principles these intentions can be treated flexibly as one principle or argument
among a set of competing principles or arguments. Thus, if
the Framers' views on a particular issue are thought wise,
say as Alexander Hamilton's views about the justification
for judicial review were deemed wise by Justice Marshall
and the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison,69 these

64. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
65. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
66. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
67. Compare William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme
Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1979) (arguing for a colorblind principle), with Laurence H. Tribe, In What Vision of the Constitution
Must the Law be Color-Blind?, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 201 (1986) (arguing that
the text, Framers' intent and precedents do not support a color-blind principle).
See also RUBENFELD, supra note 2, at 196-202, 214-18 (arguing in favor of the
anti-caste principle and against the color-blind principle).
68. Rubenfeld's paradigm method at its heart involves extracting or
determining the principles that are involved in paradigm cases and applying
them to instant cases. See RUBENFELD, supra note 2, at 178-95; supra text
accompanying note 59.
69. Compare Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176-80 (1803) with THE
FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Michael Dorf calls this type of
argument "heroic originalism." See Michael C. Dorf, IntegratingNormative and
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views should be given respect and weight in deciding a hard
case just as principles embedded in precedents are given
respect and weight in hard cases. Similarly, if the Framers'
views have helped to articulate and form a significant historical tradition in American law, say as the Framers' views
about church-state relationships have generally been
70
perceived, these views should be given respect and weight.
Moreover, in the method of principles, arguments from
Framers' intent do not have to represent the views of a collective majority of the Framers, for if they function like
arguments from precedent it is enough to treat them as a
kind of "persuasive authority" from particular public officials rather than as "binding authority. ' 71 In this approach,
Framers' intent arguments avoid many of the evidentiary
problems of originalist arguments. Treating these arguments as persuasive rather than binding also mitigates the
objection that Framers' intent arguments unfairly impose
"the dead hand of the past" (the values of white, propertyowning males) upon modern constitutional law.
There is a third interpretive method that takes the
semantic intentions of the Framers seriously, but this
method primarily looks forward in time and leaves the relevance of past events to the discretion of individual judges.
Michael Perry 72 and Christopher Eisgruber 73 have argued
that abstract provisions in the constitutional text should be
given "moral interpretations" by the judiciary, interpretations that are based on a judge's own moral convictions and
look forward to creating a more just society and government. Eisgruber recognizes that some judges probably
would appeal to history or legal precedents for guidance in
Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J.
1765, 1803 (1997).
70. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (relying on evidence
of Framers' intent to help define the parameters of the establishment clause).
Michael Dorf has named this type of argument "ancestral originalism." See
Dorf, supra note 69, at 1801.
71. Cf. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 17, at 313-54, esp. 345-46
(arguing that in cases of statutory interpretation legislators' statements of
"legislative intent" about the meaning of statutes should be treated much like
common law precedents that constitute "persuasive" rather than "binding"
authority).
72. See PERRY, supra note 16.
73. See EISGRUBER, supra note 3.
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shaping and applying their moral convictions about what is
just in particular cases, but this use of time is only optional
in Eisgruber's theory, or merely a question of style, for
judges may choose to rely on philosophy or their instincts
instead of history. 74 Political accountability for such moral
interpretations is provided, according to Perry, by a
"dialogue" between Congress and the courts through the
Congress's powers to appoint justices, to impeach justices,
and to control the jurisdiction of the courts, particularly the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 75 Eisgruber depends more on the politics of the selection process for
Supreme Court Justices to provide political authorization
for the moral interpretations of judges.76 This third method
accounts for time only in a partial or mostly forward-looking way, however, unlike the paradigm method and method
of embedded principles that look both backwards and
forwards in significant ways.
The dimension of time also appears in basic constitutional practices that help constitute the previous methods:
the doctrine of stare decisis, the broader doctrine that
precedents should guide decisions by analogy and distinction, the use of government practices as a kind of special
precedent-especially in separation-of-powers cases, 77 and
the use of arguments from America's "constitutional ethos"
or, that is, arguments which are based on our society's historical traditions such as the reliance on and respect for
values of the extended family.78 Each of these practices
engages with our social, political and legal history, and each
provides a distinct perspective on how history or time
should guide constitutional law and shape or constrain
power.

74. See id. at 109-67.
75. See PERRY, supra note 16, at 125-45.
76. See EISGRUBER, supra note 3, at 64-68.

77. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 400-02 (1819);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-13 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
78. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). For a
description and justification for such arguments from the American
constitutional ethos, see BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 93-177.

2005]

POWER, TIME, AND EVER YMAN

289

The doctrine of stare decisis has independent meaning
or bite only when judges follow prior judicial decisions even
though they would decide the issue before them differently,
or might decide the issue differently, if they wished to
entertain arguments. Yet stare decisis does not freeze particular points in constitutional law either, and both conserthat
have
recognized
vative
and liberal judges
constitutional law tolerates and deserves considerable judicial willingness to overrule precedents. 79 Judges, of course,
also have the power to draw narrow distinctions between
prior and instant cases and decide the instant case as one of
"first impression." Applications of stare decisis thus engage
judges in comparing governmental decisions over time and
decisions should continue to
assessing which historical 80
govern and which should not.
The broader doctrine of precedent, attending to arguments from prior cases by analogy and distinction, engages
courts in a similar but more intricate involvement with
history and the guidance or constraints that can be
obtained from prior government decisions. Analogies and
distinctions are commonly based upon factual similarities
and differences between cases, but the basic justification for
this reasoning, that like cases should be treated alike, is
grounded in the identification of common principles that
underlie the analogies. 81 Moreover, the analogies that are
relevant to an instant case can always be broadened by
locating and arguing for common principles that underlie
seemingly disparate factual situations. Justice Douglas
appeared to do this in Griswold by suggesting that a principle of protecting intimate familial decisions as a constitutional right could be drawn from an analogy between a
married couple's right to contraceptives, the issue in
Griswold, and a parent's right to educate her children in

79. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 213-14 (1986) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 57980 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
80. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (1991); Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
723 (1988).
81. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 30-50
(1921); Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 60, at 1083, 1090-97.
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private schools or a foreign language as recognized by prior
cases.8 2 Thus the broader doctrine of precedent engages constitutional judges in a complex assessment of American
time or history as it appears in prior cases-in Griswold, for
instance, by connecting the protection of a parent's right to
educate her children from nativist anti-foreign regulations
in the 1920s with the protection of reproductive rights in
the era of women's liberation in the 1960s.
The commitment of constitutional law to the historical
process is also furthered by the practice, relatively rare but
significant, of Supreme Court Justices relying on America's
broader historical traditions to argue for or justify particular constitutional decisions. Philip Bobbitt calls this type of
argument an "ethical argument" or, in other words, an
argument from the American constitutional ethos of limiting governments to enumerated or specific powers in order
to provide substantial room for individual freedom beyond
those rights named in the constitutional text.8 3 This type of
argument, for example, seems to have played a significant
84
role in the Supreme Court's decisions on privacy rights
8
5
and in Plyler v. Doe, where the Court held that children
who are undocumented aliens are not responsible for their
presence in the United States and thus cannot be denied a
free public education. Although arguments from historical
tradition usually find some reflection or support in constitutional texts, statutory practices or precedents, with these
arguments judges become fully engaged with the historical
process in a way that carries them effectively beyond the
text, evidence of Framers' intent and precedents.

82. See supra text accompanying notes 60-66.
83. See BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 93-119.
84. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-06 (1977)
(relying on America's traditional respect for the extended family to justify a
grandmother's privacy right to live in a "one family house" with grandchildren
who are cousins); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., concurring) (relying on "the traditions and [collective] conscience of our
people" to determine that a constitutional right of privacy is "so rooted
[there] ... as to be ranked as fundamental"); see also BOBBITT, supra note 6, at
159-65 (arguing that a right to control one's body free of governmental
interference can be found in America's constitutional ethos and justifies the
decision in Roe v. Wade to recognize the right to obtain an abortion).
85. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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As a matter of practice, then, the commitment of constitutional law to time or history is rather extensive, ranging
beyond both the limited appeal to text and Framers' intent
in orginalist theories and the broader appeal to text,
Framers' intent and precedents in common law theories. As
a matter of democracy, this extensive commitment to time
seems right for a government that would respect the human
dignity, values and interests of all persons. The extensive
commitment to time is more likely to take account, inclusively and pluralistically, of the different human values and
interests that have been expressed throughout America's
complex and rich history. Furthermore, if the method of
embedded moral/legal principles is employed to interpret
America's legal and social history, the extensive
commitment to time will provide some significant support
to the third basic constitutional value: the values of everyman.
IV. EVERYMAN
"Hermes asked Zeus how he should impart justice and reverence
among men:-Should he distribute them as the arts are
distributed; that is to say, to a favored few only [or] . . . to all? "To
all," said Zeus; "I should like them all to have a share; for cities
cannot exist, if a few share only in the virtues, as in the arts. .".." 86

The constitutional text establishes some kind of
representative democracy. But what sort of representative
democracy? Are "representatives of the people" only elected
officials, or may they include judges and other appointed officials? Moreover, how should different public officials
"represent" the public? More particularly, should American
representative democracy be thought of as merely a majoritarian process, where voters by majority votes elect public
officials who in turn make policy decisions by majority votes
(or executive orders)? In this view, constitutional constraints should be aimed only at making the majoritarian
process work more effectively, for example, by ensuring
rights to free speech to enhance majoritarian decisions and

86. PLATO, PROTAGORAS 321-25 (Benjamin Jowett, trans., New York, C.
SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION:
CONTINUITY AND INNOVATION IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 10 (1960)).

Scribner's Sons 1897) (quoted in
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rights to fair adjudicative procedures to guard against
official abuses of power. Alternatively, should representative democracy be thought of instead as a more complex
mixture of majority voting, executive actions and the judicial protection of constitutional rights that are deemed to
promote the life chances and flourishing of all persons,
including those whose interests are ignored by or unfairly
discounted in majoritarian elective and legislative processes?

87

The constitutional text does not provide a clear answer
to these questions. On the one hand, most provisions in the
constitutional text are designed to establish a majoritarian
governmental process together with limitations at the margins of the process to protect free speech rights, religious
rights and the rights to fair adjudicative procedures. These
is
provisions suggest on balance that the constitution
88
designed to promote democracy as majority rule.
On the other hand, there are significant provisions in
the constitutional text that speak beyond and against
democracy as majority rule and suggest a broader purpose
for American democracy, to promote and respect everyman's rights and interests as a matter of both rights and
the majoritarian process. There is, first of all, the Preamble,
which states that "We the People of the United States" have
established this constitution in order to, among other
things, "establish justice, . . . promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity."8 9 Consent of all the people to a constitutional
regime implies, does it not, consent to a government that
respects the rights of all persons, not just majority interests? Second, the original constitutional text provided for
the indirect selection of Senators by state legislatures 90 and
indirect selection of the President by electors to be
appointed "in such manner as the Legislature (of each
state) may direct." 91 This indirect selection process, which is

87. See, e.g.,
supra note 20.

EISGRUBER,

supra note 3;

SEIDMAN,

supra note 8;

88. See, e.g., ELY, supranote 15, at 66-101.
89. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
90. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1., amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
91. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.

SHAPIRO,
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not dissimilar to the selection of federal judges, suggests
that Senators, the President and federal judges were
thought to be public officials who should "represent" the interests of the people in different ways from those employed
by the popularly elected members of the House of Representatives. 92 Moreover, Senators are elected for six year terms
and by different numbers of voters depending on whether
they represent large or small states. These anti-majoritarian factors surely loosen the political accountability of
Senators to their electorates by comparison to the political
accountability of Representatives, who are elected by
roughly equal numbers of voters and who stand for election
every two years. Perhaps representation by Senators and by
federal judges, to take two leading examples, should be
more deliberative and more focused upon the public good
than upon the desires of immediate majorities. Third,
broadly defined universal rights are provided for every
person in several of the constitution's abstract clauses. Consider the due process clauses, that "no person" shall be
deprived of "life, liberty or property, without due process of
law;" 93 the equal protection clause, that "no State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; ' 94 the Fourteenth Amendment's forgotten
privileges and immunities clause, that "no State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; ' 95 and the
Ninth Amendment, that "the enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people. '96 Each of
these provisions, like the Preamble and indirect selection of
public officials, supports an inclusive conception of democracy that takes account of everyman's values as well as the
majority will.

92. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
93. U.S. CONST. amends. V,

XIV, § 1.

94. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
95. Id. On why this clause became a "forgotten" one and whether it should
be, compare The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) with John Harrison,
Reconstructing the Privilegesor Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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In the absence of authoritative guidance from the constitutional text, one might turn to the theory of democracy,
or of representative democracy, to help choose a constitutional theory. 97 Democracy, however, is another "essentially
contested concept," much like the rule of law idea. Some
theories of democracy focus rather exclusively upon popular
voting. 98 But other theories pay attention to democracy's
purpose of promoting the life chances of all individuals. 99 So
theories of democracy, like our constitutional text, at least
on first impression, appear to support either the inclusion
or exclusion of everyman as a fundamental constitutional
value.
Nonetheless, when Presidents and Senators select
judges, and when judges choose among different theories of
constitutional interpretation, they would be wise to contemplate the relevance of different democratic theories to
American society and constitutional law. All democratic
theories incorporate the idea of collective self-rule and majority voting. But theories that would characterize democracy as essentially majority voting, first by voters for representatives and then by representatives for policies, appear
to be in the thrall of the ideas of democracy in Greek citystates and the New England town meeting. In these

97. See Fallon, supra note 5 (suggesting that this methodology, in part, is
how constitutional theories are and should be chosen). But see Dorf, supra note
39 (arguing that the concept of political democracy is too general to provide any
guidance in choosing a constitutional theory).
98. See, e.g., DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (1987) (describing the

models of "classical democracy" in ancient Greek city-states, where voting
occurred among citizens in small, relatively homogenous communities, and
"elite democracy," which emphasizes voters choosing among members of a
society's elite, who are then relatively free to pursue their public or private
interests); see also IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE (1999) (arguing that

democracy implies two fundamental principles: collective self-rule
prohibitions against arbitrary actions by individual public officials).

and

99. See, e.g., Held, supra note 98 (describing models of "protective
democracy," which can be associated with the theories of John Locke, liberalism
and individual liberty rights; "developmental democracy," which can be
associated with the theories of Jean Jacques Rousseau and social democracy
that encourage governments to promote the flourishing of all individuals; and
"participatory democracy," which captures modern theories that focus on the
need of democratic government to promote the practical direct participation of
citizens in "key institutions of society, including the workplace and local
community").
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situations, the citizens of the community were (or are) relatively homogenous in their backgrounds and interests,
likely to share customs, capable of participating effectively
in influencing or making public policy decisions, and
perhaps likely on balance to consider the interests of all or
most persons in the community fairly when deciding
governmental issues. 100 Today, however, in relatively massive large-scale representative democracies, can one be
confident that majority voting by the electorate and by
elected representatives, at either the national or state level,
is likely to be inclusive of all persons' interests? Why should
those with majority power pursuing their interests as electors or legislators necessarily include the interests of others
outside the majority in policymaking decisions? Moreover,
why would the diverse citizens of modern America ever
consent to democracy as mere majority rule? Wouldn't they
want a system of constitutional rights that limits the
majoritarian process by recognizing rights that provide
equal respect for everyman? Wouldn't a diverse citizenry, to
ensure impartial treatment by governments, wish for
constitutional institutions like the abstract language in our
constitutional text and a judiciary that employs the method
of embedded principles, or some similar method, to recognize constitutional rights that protect the fundamental
interests or values of all persons against the sheer power of
those who wield majority power in legislatures? 10 1 A theory
of representative democracy and constitutional law that
includes the basic substantive value of respect for everyman
would seem to fit the constitutional text just as well as

100. Alexis de Tocqueville famously observed that democracy as majority
will work best in local governments like the New England township, where such
conditions are most likely to pertain. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 56-79 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds., 2000).
101. The claim for individual rights based on hypothetical consent to
government rests, of course, on the "original position" argument for the
principles of political justice in JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). But
non-contractarian political theories that are based on existing political culture
rather than consent may also justify protecting individual rights against
oppressive majoritarianism. See, e.g., TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 100 (arguing
that the "equality of conditions" in America will flourish best under a moderate
democracy that combines majority rule with substantial individual rights); cf.
SHAPIRO, supra note 20 (arguing from an historical conception of democracy
that entails both collective self-rule and an opposition to unjustifiable
hierarchies).
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procedural theories of democracy. Furthermore, such a
theory justifies constitutional law in the light of our contemporary multi-cultural society better than the theory of
representative democracy as simple majority voting.
Respecting the values of everyman would also enhance the
legitimacy of any constitutional regime in a modern democracy. The values of everyman thus deserve
recognition as a
10 2
basic dimension of constitutional law.
When one turns from theory to practice, there are additional justifications for recognizing the interests of all
persons as a fundamental constitutional value. For one
thing, this is mostly what the constitutional jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court has been about for the past sixty
years or so, and this is true for both "liberal" and "conservative" decisions of the Court. The Warren Court's expansion
of equal protection rights against race discrimination 103 and
procedural rights of criminal defendants, 10 4 and the more
conservative Burger Court's expansion of equal protection
rights against gender discrimination, 10 5 and the due process
right of privacy, most prominently to include the right to
abortions, 106 illustrate the values of everyman in constitutional practice. But so do the Rehnquist Court's contemporary interpretations of the religion, speech and equal
protection clauses that recognize the rights of religious
persons, notwithstanding the establishment clause, to practice free religious speech in public forums 10 7 and to obtain

102. Cf. Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711
(2001) (arguing that in modern governments citizens depend more on the
different kinds of interactions they have with the administrative state for their
security, welfare and protection of rights than they depend upon elections and
legislation).
103. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
104. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
105. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
106. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
107. See, e.g., Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753 (1995) (upholding the Ku Klux Klan's right to post a cross in a public
square).
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equal government funding for religious and secular educational programs. 108
The values of everyman are also embedded in two more
general constitutional practices. One is the judicial practice
of deciding cases by analogy, which in constitutional law
promotes the morally important idea of requiring governments to treat persons similarly situated in the same way.
By this reasoning, individual rights that were or have
become "popular," as for example the right to contraceptives
recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut,0 9 can become the
constitutional basis for recognizing analogous rights that
are less popular and more controversial such as the right to
an abortion recognized in Roe v. Wade 10 and subsequently
affirmed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey."' The second
practice involves the sensitive interpretation of complicated
factual situations, which seemingly can influence the judicial interpretations of relevant law. 1 2 These interpretations
can engage judicial empathy for the interests and rights of
individual persons who bring or are affected by constitutional challenges to government policies. Consider, for example, the balanced consideration of affirmative action
admissions policies and their possible social effects by
Justice Lewis Powell in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 1 13 who went on to reason that equal protection
law limited but did not ban all affirmative action programs.
Consider also the Court's interpretation of abortions and
the meaning of abortions for women and their families in
Casey," 4 as there the Court affirmed a woman's constitutional right to an abortion. One does not have to agree with
these particular interpretations to recognize them as
genuine attempts by Justices to resolve difficult issues by

108. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002)
publicly-funded vouchers for private religious schools); Rosenberger
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (approving
publication's right to get equal funding from student fees at a public
109. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
110. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
111. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
112. See SCHEPPELE, supra note 36 and accompanying text.
113. 438 U.S. 265, 315-20 (1978).
114. 505 U.S. at 852-53.

(approving
v. Rector &
a religious
university).
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considering the interests and values of all persons, especially those whose values and interests tend to be ignored
by the majoritarian legislative process.
In summary, a strong case can be made as a matter of
both practice and democracy to consider the values of
power, time and everyman as fundamental to American
constitutional law. The next section analyzes particular
theories of constitutional law by means of these values.
Which values ground particular theories? And how does
each theory take the basic values into account in interpreting constitutional sources and resolving hard cases of
constitutional law?
V. CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES

A normative constitutional theory attempts to govern,
guide or at least justify a judge's constitutional decisions,
and most theories also prescribe ways or methods of interpreting and using constitutional authorities as justifications for particular decisions. Constitutional theories may
not explain judicial differences in all difficult cases, for
judges with the same theory may divide in their interpretations of constitutional authority, say of precedents or
Framers' intent, or they may divide in interpreting a factual situation in ways that influence their application of the
same legal standard. 115 But in many pivotal cases, for
example, cases that have involved abortion rights, other
privacy rights, death penalty issues and the power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce, normative con16
stitutional theories appear to be a decisive factor.
A normative constitutional theory will present some
kind of justification for the theory's methods of interpreta-

115. See Kissam, supra note 35, at 107-08 (describing division over a
hypothetical case of tobacco regulation and free speech as a possible matter of
conflicting judicial interpretations about the nature of smoking and cigarette
advertising), 113-14 (describing division over the second amendment right to
bear arms issue as a possible matter of conflicting judicial interpretations about
Framers' intent or the nature of guns and gun regulations).
116. See id. at 90-101, 114-18 (describing the judicial differences in Roe v.
Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey as a basic division between judges
using originalist theories of interpretation and judges using the method of
principles).
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tion or decisionmaking. This justification often rests at
least in part on some conception of American democracy or
representative democracy. 117 But normative theories also
can be grounded merely in the practice of constitutional law
and the idea that practice itself justifies the use of particular methods. 118 The values of power, time and everyman
appear both in constitutional practice and as components of
different conceptions of representative democracy, and thus
these values can help us articulate both the methods and
justifications for different constitutional theories.
All constitutional theories are concerned with power,
especially the comparative powers of legislatures, the
executive and courts and the comparative powers of
national and state governments. But some theories are concerned primarily or only with power. Other theories are two
dimensional, focusing on either time or everyman in addition to the value of power. Still other theories are grounded
in the three constitutional values of power, time and
everyman. Let us consider these four basic categories of
constitutional theory in this order.
A. Power Theories
Two categories or types of normative constitutional
theory focus primarily upon power. One category consists of
the theories of basic or strict originalism, and the other
category I shall refer to as theories of open-ended or
straightforward pragmatism. These two kinds of theory differ substantially between themselves in the treatment of
power, and neither requires that attention must be paid to
the independent values of time and everyman. To be sure,
these values can appear as incidents to the application of
the originalist or pragmatic approaches, but the fundamental commitment in these two kinds of constitutional theory
is to power alone.

117. See Fallon, supra note 5, at 537.
118. See, e.g., BOBBITT, supra note 6 (eschewing formal justification and
describing constitutional law as a practice consisting of six modes or methods of
argument); Farber, supra note 12, at 1332 (seeming to rest his case for a
pragmatic theory of constitutional law on practice); Strauss, supra note 7
(describing and justifying "common law constitutionalism" as a sound workable
practice).
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Strict originalism, of the kind promoted by Antonin
Scalia"1 9 and Robert Bork, 120 argues essentially that judges
may invalidate acts by other branches of government only if
judges can rest their decisions on some relatively clear and
specific constitutional value that represents the "original
meaning" of the constitutional text. These values may be
found in constitutional text, sometimes in Framers'
intent,' 2 1 and sometimes in long-standing or well-recognized precedents that throw light upon the original mean122
ing or political intentions of the constitutional text.
Specific and long-standing traditional practices of American
governments may also throw light on the original meaning
of the constitution for originalists, for such practices
provide a kind of precedent and context from which one
may infer original meaning or political intentions. 23 But
otherwise, under the abstract provisions of the constitutional text, courts should defer to any reasonable act by a
present legislature notwithstanding that more persuasive
arguments can be made from the text, precedents, stare
decisis or other constitutional sources
that the legislative
1 24
act should be held unconstitutional.

119. See sources cited supra note 10.
120. See sources cited supra note 11.
121. For example, Justice Scalia seems willing to use evidence of Framers'
intent only as a supporting aid in interpreting the constitutional text's original
meaning, see Scalia, Originalism, supra note 10, at 856, while Judge Bork is
apparently willing to rely on evidence of Framers' intent as an independent
value when the text is quite unclear or even leans the other way. See Bork,
Neutral Principles,supra note 11, at 13 (arguing from Framers' intent to justify
the desegregation of public schools under the equal protection clause), 17-35
(arguing from Framers' intent that "free speech" should mean only political
speech that advocates legal change).
122. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (Scalia, J.)
(relying in part upon Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), to help
interpret the meaning of the free exercise of religion).
123. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710-19 (1997);
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566-70 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293-95 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Richard Broughton, The Jurisprudence of Tradition and Justice
Scalia's Unwritten Constitution, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 19 (2000); Michael
McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudenceof Tradition, 1997 UTAH L.
REV. 665.
124. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979-80 (1992) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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When a strict originalist faces precedents that are not
justified by "original meaning," either one of two moves is
prescribed by originalist theory. Such precedents may be
ripe for overruling, especially if one can argue that the
"clear and specific" values of text or Framers' intent not
only fail to support the precedent but support an opposite
result. 125 On the other hand, if such precedent is sufficiently
well-established to have gained support among a majority
of contemporary judges, or is not directly on point, it should
be interpreted as narrowly as possible to avoid expanding
constitutional law by analogy or principle where such a
decision would have "little or no cognizable
roots in the lan1 26
guage or design of the Constitution."'
Strict originalism is justified as a matter of power and
democracy in either of two ways. First, the Framers of the
constitutional text are recognized by some theorists as
having exercised the power of a "supra-majoritarian" political decision to establish the fundamental rules of American
government by means of extraordinary supra-majoritarian
procedures and standards or, in other words, by the special
constitutional convention and state ratifying conventions
that established the original constitution or by a two-thirds
vote in both houses of Congress and approval by threequarters of the state legislatures that have approved the
amendments to the constitutional text. Thus, the special
politicalpower of the Framers, and only this power, justifies
judicial invalidation of present acts by the "political"
branches of government. 127 Alternatively, the reliance of
orginalists upon the original meaning of the constitution is
justified by the claim that this provides the only "objective"
ground for establishing "neutral" rules and values that
allow constitutional cases to be decided without judges
employing their personal preferences. In other words,
judges should be limited to using original meaning because
this source, and only this source, provides a "neutral" stan-

125. See id.; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
126. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (White, J.) (justifying
narrow interpretations of the Supreme Court's privacy precedents).
127. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 56.
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or prevents the exercise of illegitimate
dard that restrains
8
judicialpower.12
In both justifications then, the idea of democracy as
majority rule by decisions of elected officials and considerations of power play a decisive role. In the first justification,
the special authority or power of the Framers to limit
today's legislatures and courts by adopting the constitutional text is perceived as "democratic" because of the
supra-majoritarian standards that the Framers followed in
adopting constitutional provisions (notwithstanding the
very limited electorates in the late eighteenth and midnineteenth centuries that selected the Framers). In the
second justification, non-elected judges are perceived to be
"undemocratic" when imposing constitutional restraints on
elected officials unless they rely on some "neutral standard"
of original meaning (notwithstanding the limited electorates in the late eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries,
the many difficulties in establishing original meaning, and
the very real possibility that judicial precedents constrain
the preferences of judges more effectively than ideas about
the original meaning of the constitutional text129). In strict
originalist theory, then, only decisions by elected representatives or the Framers are "democratic decisions," and any
judicial constraints upon elected representatives are
regrettable" because of their
suspect or at least "morally
"anti- democratic" nature. 130 As a result, strict originalist
theories tend to give substantial deference to elected representatives in many interpretations and applications of
abstract constitutional provisions. To be sure, this principle
of deference has been undercut by the ease with which
strict originalists have discovered "clear" principles of federalism in the Framers' intent that, in their view, should
31
limit Congress' powers to regulate interstate commerce'
and authorize suits against state governments as part of

128. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles,supra note 11; Scalia, supra note 33.
129. See Strauss, supra note 7, at 926-28.
130. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 17, at 16-17.

131. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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federal regulatory programs. 13 2 The principle of deference
has been similarly undercut by the ease with which strict
originalists have discovered a "clear" color-blind principle
that would forbid affirmative action programs.133 These contested discoveries, of course, illustrate that neither the
language of the constitutional text and nor evidence of
Framers' intent constrain the power of judges nearly as
much as originalists claim. Something else must be going
on.134

In any event, strict originalist theories are theories of
power. They focus on the Framers' power, the "democratic"
powers of elected officials, and a need to limit judicial
power. Time, the time and historical development of complex precedents and the time and history of fundamental
political and social developments in America, is essentially
discounted or ignored. For example, Justice Clarence
Thomas seems willing to overrule the leading precedents of
the 1930s and 1940s that recognize Congress' power to
regulate local aspects of interstate commerce that may have
"substantial effects" upon this commere, and to return to
his vision of divided national and state powers to regulate
the economy which is based on a late eighteenth, early
nineteenth century perspective on the national government's power to regulate interstate commerce. 35 Similarly,
the values of everyman, of all persons in contemporary
America, are discounted by strict originalist theories unless
these values are "clearly" incorporated in the constitutional
text as might be said, say, for the right to free exercise of
religion or right to free speech. Thus, for example, strict

132. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
133. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349-74 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). But see Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative
History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985); Tribe, supra
note 67 (arguing that no color-blind principle can be located in either the
Framers' intent or constitutional precedents of the Fourteenth Amendment).
134. For some thoughts about judicial psychology and what may motivate
originalist judges and theorists, see Kissam, supra note 35, at 118-23. See also
KENNEDY, supra note 32 (arguing that political ideology is a primary
unconscious, half conscious or conscious motivation of both liberal and
conservative judges).
135. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 596-99 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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originalists struggle to justify the decision in Brown v.
Board of Education136 that racially segregated public
schools violated the Equal Protection Clause, 137 or they find
Brown to be illegitimate as a matter of law. 138 The Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly were not concerned
with desegregating public institutions and may in fact have
not wanted the Equal Protection Clause to ban segregated
schools. 139 Furthermore, in Plessy v. Ferguson,140 which was
much closer in time to the framing of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court had held that segregated
public facilities could be "separate but equal" as long as
"equal facilities" were provided to both races, and the Plessy
Court relied expressly on an argument from Framers'
intent. So the Brown decision, a paradigm of modern constitutional law and exemplar of protecting everyman, must 1be
4
condemned by strict originalists as a wrong decision, 1
recognized as a "faint-hearted," "pragmatic" or "political"
exception to originalist theory, 142 or justified by strained
interpretations of the "clear meaning" of the Equal Protection Clause or by relying on selected Framers' ideas
about
43
racial discrimination in the nineteenth century.
Strict originalism has become popular among conservative jurists today, perhaps because it justifies desired

136. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
137. See Bork, Neutral Principles,supranote 11, at 13-15.
138. See BERGER, supra note 56, at 245.
139. See id. at 100-01, 117-33.
140. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
141. See BERGER, supra note 56, at 131-33, 245, 327-28.
142. See Scalia, Originalism, supra note 10, at 861-62 (describing "fainthearted" originalist judges who are occasionally willing to depart from
originalist principles to follow their instincts for justice).
143. E.g., Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 11, at 13-15 (claiming that
Brown was justified as a mattar of original meaning because of the Framers'
intent to eliminate "a large measure" of official racial discrimination by means
of the Fourteenth Amendment, an argument which ignores Plessy and most
scholarship on what Framers' of the Fourteenth Amendment were in fact
talking about). Compare Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
DesegregationDecisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995), with Michael J. Klarman,
Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor
McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995) (debating whether originalist arguments
can support Brown).
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results such as opposition to the abortion rights decisions
and perhaps more fundamentally because its focus on
power is consistent with the increasing celebration of
unconstrained American power in the post-Cold War era. In
any event, this approach has contributed to contemporary
constitutional debate in two significant ways: by emphasizing the need to justify judicial methods of interpretation
and by emphasizing the potential value of paying attention
to both the language of the constitutional text and evidence
of Framers' intent. Other constitutional theories must
respond to these emphases.
The second category of power theories consists of openended pragmatic approaches to constitutional decisionmaking. These approaches display considerable variation,
especially in the nature of their commitments to the interpretation and use of conventional constitutional authorities,
especially precedents. 144 As Richard Posner has said,
however, the pragmatic approach to adjudication may be
characterized as "instrumental, forward-looking, activist,
empirical, skeptical, antidogmatic, experimental."'145 In this
approach the pragmatic judge should strive to be neutral
between persons in deciding the disputes before her, but she
will not discover neutral standards within the complex
maze of legal authorities. Arguments from text, Framers'
intent and precedents may be useful as rules-of-thumb or
guidelines, at least to some pragmatists, 146 or as rebuttable
presumptions to others.1 47 But in difficult cases, the pragmatic judge should ultimately be guided by her understanding of the facts, both adjudicative and legislative facts,
by her understanding of consequences, and by her instincts
or preferences for fashioning good results in particular
48
cases and good rules for contemporary society.

144. Compare POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 12 (little if any
commitment to arguments from conventional constitutional sources or
"history"), with Farber, supra note 12 (claiming a substantial but indeterminate
commitment of pragmatists to arguments from text, Framers' intent, and
precedents).
145. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 12, at 11. See also Brest, supra
note 58, at 228; Farber, supra note 12, at 1344 (making the same point).
146. See Farber, supranote 12, at 1332-53.

147. See Brest, supranote 58, at 228-37.
148. See POSNER, LAw, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 12, at 59-
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Straightforward pragmatism thus turns away from interpretation as a central aspect of decision-making and from
grounding constitutional decisions in time or history, and it
considers the values of everyman only in a rudimentary or
general sense-to the extent that individual judges may
wish to rely on these values as justifications for their
results. The pragmatic approach to constitutional theory
focuses instead on the active aspects of judicial power, as it
may assist good government, and invites judges to engage
in careful positive or empirical analysis of the facts of cases,
the consequences of rules, and both the significance and
consequences of particular interactions between judicial,
executive, legislative and private powers.
Judge Posner's analysis of Griswold v. Connecticut149
illustrates the pragmatic approach to constitutional law. In
deciding to invalidate or uphold Connecticut's ban on the
use of contraceptives, the pragmatic judge would not
attempt to recognize or reject a general right of privacy
based on abstract provisions of the constitutional text or on
precedents decided under these provisions, as the Supreme
Court Justices in Griswold endeavored to do. 150 Instead, the
pragmatic judge would focus on pertinent adjudicative and
legislative facts concerning Connecticut's statute, and she
might reasonably decide to invalidate the contraceptive ban
on the facts that (1) most nineteenth century bans on
contraceptives had been repealed by state legislatures in
the twentieth century and only Connecticut and
Massachusetts retained these bans; (2) repeated attempts
to repeal Connecticut's statute "had been blocked by the
vigorous lobbying of the Catholic Church working on the
[state's] large Catholic population"; and (3) the only
enforcement of Connecticut's statute had been against birth
control clinics, thus disadvantaging poor and uneducated
women who relied on such clinics for contraceptive advice
and devices. 151 Thus, a pragmatic decision in Griswold
would have employed the judicial power to invalidate a
state's legislative power on narrow grounds without creat64; POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 12, at 12, 191-97; Brest, supra note

58, at 228-29.
149. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

150. See supratext accompanying notes 60-66.
151. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supranote 12, at 193.
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ing any broad precedent, rule, principle or doctrine that
would have consequences for other kinds of "privacy" cases.
A pragmatic decision might have relied on the exercise of
legislative power by the majority of states that had repealed
their bans on contraceptives in order to justify invalidating
statutes in two states. A pragmatic judge, at least one of
Judge Posner's intrepid nature, might also have based her
decision on perceived flaws in the "democratic process" in
Connecticut, where sectarian and class-based interests
appear to have ignored the needs of poor and uneducated
women. This, of course, would be to apply the values of
everyman-but only if an individual judge is inclined to
make this sort of sensitive political judgment.
The justification for the pragmatic approach to constitutional decision-making seems to be based on three claims.
First, in hard cases authoritative materials like the constitutional text, Framers' intent, and precedents provide no
guarantee of supporting constitutional decisions that are
useful to society. Second, in difficult constitutional decisions
the "democratic" power of the elected branches of government should be respected except where there are demonstrable flaws in the exercise of such power that favor special
interests and ignore democratic values of the kind Judge
Posner perceives in Griswold. Third, a judge's instincts or
preferences for justice and good results are reliable guides
to good decisions in hard cases, or at least they are more
reliable than arguments from the rules, principles, and
analogies of constitutional sources. Thus constitutional
time, other than in an instrumental sense, and the values of
everyman are not necessary or independent aspects of
straightforward judicial pragmatism.
In comparison to strict originalist theories, pragmatic
theories cast a refreshing light upon the actual exercise of
constitutional powers. They also have the considerable
merit of pointing to the values of positive analysis and
sensitive interpretation of the relevant legislative facts in a
case and to the consequences of actual and potential legal
rules. At the same time, one wonders about the freedom
that is granted by this approach for judges to exercise their
own instincts for good results uncabined by any necessary
connections to relevant decisions by earlier government
officials and unrelated to any theory of everyman's values
in representative democracy. With time and everyman discounted or dismissed, are pragmatic judges likely to have
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''representative" instincts and preferences for justice?
Judges are a professional caste of their own, and perhaps
more likely to represent in their instincts, preferences or
tastes the interests of property, wealth and government
power that they have learned to protect and promote in
their careers as successful lawyers and as successful politicians who have obtained judicial appointments. Theories
which make time or everyman necessary components of
constitutional decisions may be more promising normative
theories to guide constitutional law in our representative
democracy.
B. Power and Time Theories
There are two categories of normative constitutional
theories that attempt to incorporate both power and time in
an integrated fashion. One category consists of "common
law" theories of constitutional interpretation, theories
which modify originalism substantially by granting independent weight to constitutional precedents and the
common law tradition of deciding cases by reasoning from
precedents as well as from text and Framers' intent. The
second category consists of "complex originalist" theories
that attempt in various ways to reconcile the constitutional
text and Framers' intent with the dramatically changing
conditions in American history. Both types of theory improve upon the theories of strict originalism and openended pragmatism. These theories, in their different ways,
allow constitutional law to evolve over time (unlike strict
originalism), and they insist upon establishing some kind of
necessary connection between contemporary constitutional
decisions and the past constitutional decisions of American
public officials (unlike straightforward or open-ended
pragmatism).
The common law approach to constitutional law has
five distinct features. 152 First, judges should concentrate on
deciding the specific factual disputes before the court and
providing sound reasons for these decisions and be less
concerned with establishing, recognizing and maintaining a
system of general rules. Narrow case holdings rather than

152. The following summary is drawn from Sunstein, supra note 13, and
Strauss, supra note 7.
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broader rules constitute the essence of constitutional law in
this approach, and each decision in a hard case leaves much
room for future decisionmaking in similar situations.
Second, reasoning from prior cases emphasizes not only arguments by factual analogies from the "holdings" of prior
cases but also arguments from the "principles" in the
rationales of prior decisions, or even principles that might
have been used to justify a prior decision in a more satisfactory manner. Because any difficult case usually presents
competing analogies and principles, however, the reasoning
in common law constitutional decisions may be said to be
"incompletely theorized,"'153 or still open to argument, by
comparison to the more confident and apparently dispositive type of rationale that is provided by other theories such
as strict originalism. Third, the independent weight given
to precedents requires an important role for the doctrine of
stare decisis, which protects at least "principled" prior decisions from overruling even if a prior decision is thought to
be a "mistake" as the best interpretation of the text,
Framers' intent and precedents. 154 Fourth, the common law
approach does not deny the authority of arguments from
text and Framers' intent but treats these arguments more
flexibly than strict originalism does. This flexibility is
obtained either by following the concept of "moderate
originalism," which interprets the text and Framers' intent
only by means of general purposes, 155 or by relying only on
originalist ideas that are considered to be wise or have
156
become part of the American constitutional ethos.
Finally, many common law theorists may recognize the
power of judges in exceptional cases to rely on pragmatic or
moral judgments that in their opinion outweigh the best

153. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 1733, 1739-42 (1995).
154. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992)

(maintaining Roe v. Wade's holding of a woman's constitutional right to an
abortion on the basic ground that "reservations any of us may have in
reaffirming the central holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication of
individual liberty we have given combined with the force of stare decisis");
Kissam, supra note 35, at 114-16.
155. Brest, supra note 58, at 204-24.
156. See Dorf, supra note 69, at 1801-03; see supra text accompanying notes
69-70.
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argument from constitutional authorities. 15 7 This move
approaches open-ended pragmatism, but common law
theory is differentiated by its insistent commitment to
precedents, with pragmatic or moral judgments admitted
only as a last resort. This is a difference of degree, perhaps,
but an important one.
The common law approach to constitutional law is
manifest in many constitutional decisions, 158 and this
approach's fit with and ability to explain most constitutional decisions and practices constitute a basic justification
for the approach. 159 Two other justifications are also available. As a matter of Framers' intent, the common law
approach is quite probably how the Framers of the constitution expected judges to exercise judicial power, by doing
what eighteenth century judges did-deciding common law
cases. There is also the pragmatic argument of Cass
Sunstein and others that the common law approach has
worked tolerably well for America, especially in view of its
ability to sustain a dialogue of reasonable disagreements
about what the constitution means by focusing on relatively
narrow reasoning that leaves continued opportunities for
debates and for fashioning new agreements as conditions
change.160
Common law theories of constitutional law are, however, fundamentally conservative. They can capture the
values of everyman but only through the happenstance of
prior decisions that may be relied on for arguments by
analogy, principle and the doctrine of stare decisis.
Compare, for example, the Supreme Court's 1986 decision

157. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 7, at 900-03.
158. On narrow, fact-specific decisionmaking by the Supreme Court, see, for
example, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). On reasoning by analogies or distinctions and
principles from prior cases, see Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). On the importance of stare decisis to
common law constitutional judges, see, for example, Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). On reasoning from general purposes underlying the
constitutional text and Framers' intent, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); supratext accompanying notes 60-66.
159. See Strauss, supranote 7, at 888.
160. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 10-14; Sunstein, supra note 153;
Strauss, supra note 7.
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in Bowers v. Hardwick,161 which upheld application of
Georgia's ban on sodomy to homosexuals when the only privacy rights precedents concerned marriage, reproductive
rights and families, with the Court's recent decision in
Lawrence v. Texas 162 that overruled Bowers and invalidated
sodomy statutes. By 2003, the Lawrence Court could justify
its decision by relying on privacy rights and other precedents that had applied equal protection's anti-caste
principle to regulations discriminating against homosexuals, 163 had assumed a privacy or liberty right to refuse or
withdraw from life-support systems, 164 and had reaffirmed
165
on quality of life grounds the right to an abortion.
The common law approach also relies heavily on technical arguments from precedents that can fail to provide
persuasive public justifications in controversial cases. For
example, Justice Blackmun's much-criticized opinion for the
Court in Roe v. Wade166 seems to rely in critical places upon
unconvincing arguments from precedent. 167 Justice Scalia's
opinion in Employment Division v. Smith,168 which relaxed
the standard for judicial protection of the right to free exercise of religion and triggered passage of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act 169 by overwhelming majorities in
both houses of Congress, similarly relies on technical arguments from precedent. Perhaps additional sources and
methods of constitutional law and argument are needed to
address these weaknesses in common law theory.
Complex originalist theories may be viewed as attempts
to improve upon weaknesses in both strict originalism (a
fixed constitution, which fails to account for changing social

161. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
162. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
163. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
164. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
165. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
166. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
167. See id. at 158-59 (relying on cases that refuse to recognize the rights of
fetuses as persons).
168. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000) (original version at ch. 21B, §§ 2-7, 107 Stat.
1488, 1488-89 (1993)).
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conditions and concepts) and common law theories (inadequate justifications of constitutional principle). These new
and innovative theories attempt to integrate power and
time in constitutional law by introducing strong concepts of
literary, political or philosophical thought into the methods
and practice of constitutional interpretation. Although
these theories differ significantly among themselves, they
share a common commitment to the general idea of
originalism as the fundamental source of constitutional law
and they bring insightful concepts of interpretation to both
the constitutional text and constitutional history.
The most modest of these theories is Lawrence Lessig's
concept that the original meaning of text and Framers'
intent has to be "translated" from its linguistic and social
contexts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries into
modern linguistic and social contexts if the text and
Framers' intent are to be rationally understood and applied
to contemporary constitutional issues. 170 Of course, strict
originalists and common law theorists admit to a limited
kind of translation, especially the use of factual analogies to
help apply the constitutional text to modern situations.
These theorists, for example, would have no trouble
accepting an analogy between ships (which were in the
minds of Framers) and trains or airplanes (which were not)
in order to uphold modern Congressional regulation of the
newer forms of interstate transportation. But Lessig's
translation theory has broader implications, for it also
takes into account changing concepts in political, social and
legal discourse that help one understand and interpret new
factual situations. 171 Thus, for example, translation theory
can justify expansive interpretations of the commerce power
by relying on contemporary concepts and discourse about
what constitutes "commerce among the several States" and
what constitutes "necessary and proper" laws to implement
the regulations of modern interstate commerce, and it can
also justify an expansive scope for free speech rights by
relying on our expansive modern concepts about "the individual," "politics" and "free speech."

170. See Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, supra note 19; Lessig, Fidelity in
Translation,supranote 19.
171. See, e.g., Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,supra note 19, at 1369-71.
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Bruce Ackerman's "dualist" theory of constitutional law
would integrate power and time by making certain bold
interpretations of America's political and constitutional
history. 172 Ackerman divides the politics of law-making into
two fundamentally different stages: moments of "constitutional politics," when "We the People" by the exercise of
appropriate procedures are focused and generally agreed
upon establishing particular constitutional principles, and
the everyday conduct of "normal politics," when elected representatives adopt laws that are subject to the principles
established by constitutional moments. Importantly,
Ackerman perceives three co-equal constitutional moments
in American history when "We the People" acted by different but analogous extra-legal procedures to establish constitutional principles of different purpose. In Ackerman's
account, the writing of the original constitution (which was
written by a constitutional convention organized by the
states to propose amendments to the Articles of Confederation) and the Bill of Rights was designed to promote
fundamental liberties by means of protecting liberty rights
directly, by separating the powers of national and state
governments, and by creating the three "co-equal" or "independent" branches of a new national government. The Civil
War Amendments were adopted (again by extra-legal
procedures, since Southern States were coerced into
approving the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments) to
protect the fundamental right of equality. Then, in the
1930s, the election of 1936 resolved the crisis of a basic
conflict between President Roosevelt and Congress, on the
one hand, and the New Deal-limiting Supreme Court on the
other, by establishing widespread popular approval of the
modern administrative state. In this dualist view of the
constitution and constitutional moments, the basic task of
the Supreme Court is to preserve the fundamental principles established by these moments and, in difficult cases, to
"synthesize" or "reconcile" conflicts between the different
principles of the three moments. Thus, Ackerman explains
and justifies Brown v. Board of Education173 as an
"intergenerational synthesis" of the second constitutional
moment, the principle of equality, with the third constitu-

172. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 19.

173. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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tional moment, the principle of the modern administrative
state as manifest in public schools. 174 Similarly, he explains
and justifies Griswold v. Connecticut175 as the synthesis of
the first constitutional moment, the principle of liberty,
with the third constitutional moment, the principle of the
administrative state. 76 These concepts in Ackerman's
dualist theory are only a framework for interpretation, not
a recipe, and Ackerman has promised us more specific details about how such interpretations should be done in the
forthcoming third volume of his trilogy.
Akhil Amar more recently has advanced a "holistic"
approach to interpreting the constitutional text and its
history. 177 Amar's theory appears to remain closer to specific terms of the constitutional text and specific
constitutional history than Ackerman's, but Amar's theory
too incorporates insightful interpretive methods. Amar's
"intratextualism"'178 is a method that looks closely and
imaginatively at any other provisions in the constitutional
text that might provide possible assistance to determining
the meaning of a particular constitutional term. More
significantly, Amar interprets the eighteenth century Bill of
Rights through the prism of the Fourteenth Amendment,
intratextualism and the Framers' intent underlying the
Fourteenth Amendment. He argues that the Bill of Rights
was originally intended to promote federalism (for example,
by keeping Congress from regulating speech or religion) and
popular collective rights (for example, the right to assemble
for political protest), but by the 1860s the Bill of Rights was
understood to protect personal rights against majorities as
well and intended to define individual rights protected
against states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 79 On this account, expansive "originalist" readings of textual provisions
like the speech and religion clauses of the First Amendment

174. See ACKERMAN, supra note 19, at 142-50.
175. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
176. ACKERMAN, supra note 19, at 150-58.
177. AMAR, supra note 19; Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV.L.
REV. 747 (1999).

178. Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 178, at 748, 788-95.
179. See AMAR, supra note 19, at 163-283.
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become possible.' 80 Amar's holistic interpretations produce
specific results that may strike some readers as oldfashioned, such as his preference for an individual right to
guns under the Second Amendment. l8 ' But in general
Amar's theory modifies and expands eighteenth and
nineteenth century meanings to justify a thoroughly modern constitutional law, especially by his argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment transformed the basic nature of
constitutional rights from the eighteenth century idea of
popular rights (or rights of the majority) against arbitrary
government actions into the more modern idea of individual
rights against unreasonable exercises of the majority will.
A fourth complex originalist theory is Jed Rubenfeld's,
which is presented in his book, Freedom and Time. 8 2 Much
of Rubenfeld's argument is devoted to establishing the
proposition that a stable, productive, flourishing constitutional democracy requires a commitment to interpreting
and using "the people's" inheritance of a written constitution that necessarily exists (in any large representative
83
democracy) and must be adapted to changing conditions.
Given the United States' reliance upon the power of judicial
review as a major part of this commitment, Rubenfeld then
outlines a "paradigm method" of constitutional interpretation by which courts should reason from the principles of
the paradigm situations that provisions in the constitutional text were designed to address. For example,
Rubenfeld argues that Brown v. Board of Education8 4 and,
more tentatively, the constitutionality of affirmative action
programs are justified by reasoning from the core purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 1860s: to redress
instances of public discrimination against AfricanAmericans by authorizing Congress to pass civil rights
laws. 8 5 Rubenfeld never clarifies, however, why courts may
not also rely upon arguments from the general language in

180. See id. at 231-57.
181. See id. at 257-66; Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case
Study in ConstitutionalInterpretation,2001 UTAH L. REV. 889, 896-900.

182. RUBENFELD, supra note 2.
183. See id. at 91-195.
184. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
185. RUBENFELD, supra note 2, at 178-220.
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constitutional provisions, the "semantic intentions" of the
Framers as it were, or upon arguments from precedents
that were not based on paradigm situations, or upon arguments from the American constitutional ethos. Such
arguments also seem to be part of the American people's
inheritance of a written constitution that requires interpretation over time. In essence, Rubenfeld provides a powerful
argument for the commitment to constitutional time and for
adjusting constitutional law over time, but he fails to
distinguish his paradigm method from other methods of
interpretation or to explain why the paradigm method
should be the exclusive or primary
method of constitutional
18 6
interpretation in hard cases.
Common law and complex originalist theories are thus
fully committed to time in their different ways, although
complex originalism in general appears to be more flexible,
less technical and less conservative than the common law
approach. These theories provide for constitutional interpretations that are guided by constitutional authority but
capable of making adjustments to modern conditions.
Pragmatically speaking, we might say that both types of
theory provide useful methods of constitutional interpretation. Neither type of theory, however, is committed to the
values and interests of all persons in a democracy except as
particular constitutional authorities and methods of interpretation happen to provide such commitment. We turn,
then, to consider constitutional theories that incorporate an
overt commitment to everyman.
C. Power and Everyman Theories
Several recent theories of constitutional law respect
constitutional powers and at the same time emphasize the
constitutional role of courts in facilitating democracy by
recognizing the individual rights of all persons to certain
liberties and equal treatment, especially the rights of
persons who tend to be losers in the majoritarian processes
of voting for and by elected officials. These theories display
different methods and justifications but they also share

186. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Grand Theory of ConstitutionalLaw?, 100
MICH. L. REV. 1249, 1261-62 (2002) (reviewing JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND
TIME (2001)).

2005]

POWER, TIME, AND EVER YMAN

317

common features. Most significantly, each of the theories is
based on a broad conception of democracy, that a healthy
democratic government should be a government for all persons and not merely for the winners in voting for elected
officials and the winners in the legislative process.' 8 7 At the
same time, these theories are not committed to the value of
constitutional time. These theories make variable use of the
constitutional text, Framers' intent and precedents as
guidelines or possible sources for decisions or justifications.
But in each theory any argument from constitutional
authority may be overcome by political or moral judgments
that promote everyman.
Political scientist Terri Peretti188 and law professor
Louis Seidman' 8 9 have recently advanced theories of
constitutional law that might be called theories of "liberal
pragmatism." Like other pragmatic theorists, Peretti and
Seidman are skeptical of the value or binding quality of
arguments from constitutional authority, and they perceive
constitutional decision-making to be essentially a political
task that is or should be informed by the political judgment
of judges. 190 Unlike straightforward pragmatists, however,
Peretti and Seidman argue that the proper role of constitutional courts in a democracy is to offer losers in the majoritarian process opportunities to make persuasive arguments
to the courts that may simply outweigh the brute results of
majority voting that have imposed unfair burdens on the
losers. These theorists, in their different ways, call for
judges to be (or describe them as) pragmatic decisionmakers who can improve the chances to make constitu-

187. Needless to say, these two groups of winners are not identical. Voters
don't have to have policy preferences. Moreover, the legislative process may
favor small constituencies with particularly intense desires, say, the gun lobby
or anti-abortion groups, or special interests with the wealth to support
candidates and buy access to legislators, or their own particular interests in
getting re-elected. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 20, at 30-42 (discussing the
ways in which public choice theory has demonstrated deficiences in the ability
of legislatures to represent the majority will). In general, the legislative process
today might be said to favor "powerful interest groups whose constituencies are
the major corporations and wealthiest Americans." Sheldon Wolin, Inverted
Totalitarianism,THE NATION, May 19, 2003, at 13.
188. PERETTI, supra note 31.
189. See, e.g., SEIDMAN, supra note 8.
190. See, e.g., PERETTI, supra note 31, at 80-160; SEIDMAN, supra note 8.
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tional democracy legitimate for all persons. 191
Both Peretti and Seidman discount the role of interpretation in constitutional law and they do not prescribe
special methods for judicial decisionmaking. Peretti counsels paying careful attention to factual situations and the
possible consequences of particular rules or, in other words,
exercising wise political judgment, 192 and she relies on the
political selection of judges to adequately ensure their
political wisdom. 193 Seidman has less faith in the political
wisdom or virtues of American judges 194 but argues
nonetheless that the structure and "unsettling" quality of
constitutional arguments provide opportunities to make
imaginative constitutional arguments on behalf of the losers in the majoritarian process. 195 Both theories have the
considerable merit of fitting or providing loosely constructed
justifications for the many inconsistencies and contingencies that seem to inform constitutional law.
But one wonders why a judicial selection process that is
driven by the will and interests of political calculations by
elected officials 196 would ever be likely to produce pragmatic
judges with wisdom sufficient to assess the fairness to all
individuals of majoritarian results. Perhaps judges instead
should obtain guidance from the decisions of others in
comparable situations as represented by the constitutional
sources of text, Framers' intent and precedent-to ensure at
least a broader background on deliberations about individ-

191. See PERETTI, supra note 31, at 189-225; SEIDMAN, supra note 8, at 5486. Neither Peretti nor Seidman, it should be noted, argue for an absolute
preference for the losers in the majoritarian process; they argue rather for an
appreciation of an open-ended judicial decisionmaking process that will provide
opportunities for the losers to make persuasive arguments against the
majority's position. See also ROBERT JUSTIN LIPKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTIONS: PRAGMATISM AND THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONALISM (2000) (arguing for a theory of "paradigm shifts" in
constitutional decisionmaking by the courts that in his view tends to respect the
interests and rights of those who are outsiders or excluded from current
majoritarian processes).
192. See PERETTI, supra note 31, at 133-60.
193. See id. at 80-132.
194. See SEIDMAN, supra note 8, at 87.
195. See id. at 86-172.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 29-39.
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ual rights. To be sure, a political judgment represents a
form of judging, but is this what American judges are
expected to deliver either by the politicians who select them
or by the people they represent? Liberal pragmatism may
fit and seem to justify many controversial results in constitutional law, but this kind of constitutional theory neither
fits with nor justifies our traditional constitutional methods
or our traditional political expectations about what judges
are supposed to do.
Michael Perry 97 and, more recently, Christopher
Eisgruber, 198 have advanced theories of constitutional decision-making that depend upon the moral judgments or
convictions of judges rather than their political or legal
judgments. Since moral reasoning and judgment focus on
the rights of persons, Perry's and Eisgruber's theories are
clearly aimed at promoting the values of everyman in constitutional law. Both theories also take account of constitutional power. Perry reserves moral judgments for issues of
individual rights, since he encourages courts to defer to the
policy judgments of one or more elected branches of government on most structural issues that concern the allocation of power between different branches of government. 199
Eisgruber distinguishes the relative complexity of moral
judgments that are involved in structural issues and issues
of economic regulation from the more straightforward or
"direct" moral questions of individual rights, 200 and on the
former issues courts should in his view generally (but not
always) defer to reasonable judgments by the elected
branches. 20 1 On issues of human rights, however, Eisgruber
argues that courts are the better government institution to
consider and decide moral/constitutional issues. 20 2 He also
argues that the courts, because of the political selection of
judges, are likely to decide these issues in ways that will

197. See e.g., PERRY, supra note 16.
198.

See e.g.,

EISGRUBER,

supra note 3.

199. See generally PERRY, supra note 16, at 37-60 (arguing that "noninterpretive review" is not justified in federalism and separation-of-powers
cases except when the federal executive and legislature are in conflict).
200. See EISGRUBER, supra note 3, at 169-74.
201. See id. at 161-204.
202. See id. at 109-61.
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have or at least ultimately will generate popular appeal. 203
Like Peretti then, Eisgruber relies on the judicial selection
process to ensure that judges will exercise their moral
convictions in ways that are likely to satisfy the American
public that constitutional judgments are legitimate.
Both Perry and Eisgruber rely to an extent on the presence of abstract moral concepts in the constitutional text to
justify their theories of moral decision-making in rights
cases. In addition, both would allow judges to consider the
constitutional sources of text, Framers' intent, and precedent for guidance in making moral judgments about individual rights. But in each theory, judges are free to disregard the results supported by constitutional authorities if in
their considered moral judgment the law should be otherwise. 20 4 Neither theorist or theory is particularly committed
to the value of constitutional time.
The most intriguing and problematic aspects of these
theories, in my view, lie in the justifications that Perry and
Eisgruber provide for moral decisionmaking by judges in
difficult constitutional cases of individual or human rights.
Perry argues that the American people are committed to a
concept of "moral evolution," a concept that involves
resolving fundamental moral-political problems by moral
reasoning and prophecy rather than moral conventions.
Perry also argues, in the alternative, that the American
people are at least committed to the possibility of discovering "the truth" about moral-political problems even if they
are not committed to moral evolution. In Perry's view, the
courts are the government institution best designed to carry
out either of these functions because of their deliberative
process, their focus on adjudicative facts, and their application of standards to resolve disputes. 205 Eisgruber, in
contrast, argues from a broad conception of democracy, that
a democratic government should display "impartiality" to
all persons in the sense that government must take seriously the interests and values of all persons, not just the
winners in the majoritarian process. 20 6 He then argues that

203. See id. at 64-66.
204. See id. at 109-35; PERRY, supra note 16, at 91-165.
205. See id. at 97-102.
206. See EISGRUBER, supra note 3, at 18-20, 40-42, 46-108.

2005]

POWER, TIME, AND EVER YMAN

courts are the best institution to promote this impartiality
of
by making moral judgments about the specific meaning 207
the abstract rights provisions in the constitutional text.
But similar to Perry, Eisgruber grounds his argument in a
claim that the American people recognize and value the
distinction between decisions of policy or expediency, which
usually are better made by the elected branches of government, and decisions of moral principle, which can be made
better by the courts in individual rights cases. 20 8 He also
claims that American judges deploying their own moral
at judgments that will ulticonvictions are likely to arrive
209
mately have popular appeal.
Whether Perry's or Eisgruber's claims about the
American people's expectations and understandings are
sufficient to justify moral decision-making by judges unconstrained by constitutional authorities, or time, is an
interesting but difficult question. As normative claims
about what the American people and constitutional law
should be, these claims may be attractive. But they reach
well beyond our traditional sources of constitutional justification and, more importantly, they seem to ignore more
specific popular expectations about judges - that the judge's
task is to decide cases in accordance with "legal standards"
or "the law." As empirical claims about what the American
people may expect or accept about constitutional law, these
claims are controversial at best and unpersuasive at worst.
While public controversies over prayer in the public schools
and abortion rights might illustrate Michael Perry's claim
of American desires for moral evolution, or for moral truth,
do not the sharp moral divisions about these and similar
issues and the lack of moral desire about most political
issues in contemporary America suggest instead popular
acceptance of moral relativism? Similarly, public resistance
to the Supreme Court's prayer and abortion decisions would
appear to contradict Christopher Eisgruber's claim that the
public is likely to accept moral judgments by the Supreme
Court. Much of this resistance also argues for the exercise
of legislative powers rather than judicial resolution, thus

207. See id. at 136-67.
208. See id. at 53.
209. See id. at 64-66.
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seeming to contradict Eisgruber's claim that the American
people accept or cherish the distinction between decisions of
policy and decisions of moral principle.
Attractive as liberal pragmatic and moral theories may
be, perhaps constitutional judging would benefit from the
added dimension of a full commitment to constitutional
time. This value represents an important part of our inheritance, and managed appropriately our constitutional
history can be a rich source of methods and insights into the
values of power and everyman. We turn then to consider
three theories that are committed to power, time and
everyman.
D. Three-Dimensional Theories
In the past 25 years, three theories of constitutional law
have emerged that can fairly be characterized as committed
to the three basic constitutional values. There are differences between these theories, particularly in their different
perspectives about the point of constitutional law, their
balancing of the basic values, and the results they support
in particular cases. But each theory offers rich insights into
the nature of American constitutional law, and each is
relatively comprehensive in terms of its interdependent
commitments to power, time, and everyman.
John Hart Ely's representation-reinforcing theory of
judicial review justifies much of modern constitutional law
while attempting to limit judicial power to ensure that its
exercise against the power of elected branches is consistent
with a majoritarian concept of democracy. 210 Ely argues
that judicial interpretation of the abstract constitutional
rights provisions should be guided by the idea that the
constitutional role of the courts in a democracy is to protect
"process writ large" against arbitrary and oppressive acts
by the elected branches of government. This role includes
correcting flaws in the "representational process," when
elected representatives restrict speech or the political process to protect their own interests in reelection and when
majorities of voters and their representatives effectively or
permanently exclude the interests of outsiders or, as Chief

210. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 15.
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Justice Stone put it, when "prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities. '211 In
Ely's view, the special role of the judiciary in interpreting
constitutional authorities is committed to only certain
values of everyman, to the values for all persons of an ideal
majoritarian process. Ely's theory, however, does not support the more robust commitment to the values of everyman
that are represented by the recognition of "substantive" or
"fundamental" rights of privacy under the Due Process
213
clauses, 212 which have been applied to protect families,
reproductive rights, 21 4 and, most recently, sexual orientation 21 5 from restrictive majoritarian legislation. This kind of
constitutional decisionmaking, in Ely's view, constitutes the
imposition of personal judicial views on the majority will
and is anti-democratic.
Ely's theory is also committed to the value of constitutional time in two particular ways. First, he relies on
certain historical developments such as the emergence and
growth of political parties, the gradual expansion of the
franchise including adoption of the representation-expanding constitutional amendments (the Fifteenth, Seventeenth,
Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments), and many
leading decisions of the Supreme Court to justify his theory
and
that the basic point of constitutional law has 21been,
6
should be, to perfect the representational process.
Second, a primary motivation for Ely's theory is to
provide a sound constitutional justification for controversial
Warren Court interpretations of the Equal Protection
as the one-person, one-vote decision in Reynolds
clause such
v. Sims 217 and the application of heightened or strict judi-

211. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
212. See ELY, supra note 15, at 43-72.

213. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
214. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
215. See Lawrence v. Texas, U.S. (2003).
216. See ELY, supra note 15, at 73-101. See also id. at 101-79.
217. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See ELY, supra note 15, at 116.25.
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cial scrutiny to legislation that disadvantages racial minorities. 218 But Ely's theory does not embrace or explain all
significant constitutional precedents, since it would allow
majority voting for and by elected officials to restrict or
prohibit the exercise of the substantive privacy rights of
orientation
reproduction, familial development and sexual 219
rights.
Process
Due
as
recognized
been
have
that
Philip Bobbitt makes no attempt to ground his practicebased theory of constitutional law in some underlying foundational theory of the constitution or democracy. 220 Instead,
he describes six modes or methods of constitutional argument that he perceives in constitutional law, 221 and several
"constitutional functions" that the different modes serve
222
when they are employed in Supreme Court argument.
Judges choose their arguments to justify results in particular cases, but these choices will reflect or be guided by
the individual styles of judges and the constitutional functions at stake in particular cases. 223 Bobbitt's basic claim is
that this complex matrix of methods and functions has
become an important and accepted practice that legitimates
itself and provides diverse grounds for justifying the practice of judicial review.224
Considerations of public and private power are
embedded in several, if not all, of Bobbitt's six methods. The
method of history or Framers' intent respects the supramajoritarian power of the Framers of the constitutional
text.225 The doctrinal method, of constructing and applying
precedential rules, 226 and the textual method, by which
judges can sweep away precedents by giving fresh, contem218. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. 1; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954); ELY, supra note 15, at 135-179.

219. See supra text accompanying notes 213-16.
220. See BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 3-8.
221. See id.
at 9-124. See also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1991) (giving further illustration of the six modes of
constitutional argument).
222. See BOBBITT, supra note 6, 190-95. See also id. at 176-242.
223. See id. at 123-24.
224. See id. at 3-7, 181.
225. See id. at 9-24.
226. See id. at 39-58.
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porary meaning to words in the constitutional text, 227 are
both exercises of the judicial power to make ultimate interpretations of the constitution. The structural method of
inferring values from the different institutional structures
created by the constitution such as the different branches of
government and national and state governments invites
courts to consider the relative balance of power between
different government agencies. 228 So does the prudential
method, which requires courts to carefully balance the circumstances of and competing values involved in particular
situations. 229 Finally, the latter two methods and the
"ethical method," or argument from the American "constitutional ethos, ' 230 each in their different ways invite courts to
consider relative balances of power between government
and private actors.
Bobbitt's methods in the aggregate are also committed
to the value of constitutional time. The variable use of the
six methods of argument, where none is essentially privileged over the others, can explain and justify many complicated and seemingly inconsistent precedents that the
Supreme Court has decided over time. In addition, the
doctrinal, historical and ethical modes of argument are
clearly arguments from time, or constitutional history.
It is with regard to the values of everyman that
Bobbitt's theory may seem to fall somewhat short, especially because Bobbitt argues against the use of moral
arguments in constitutional law. 231 But Bobbitt views the
concept of limited government, which was established for
the national government by the original constitution and
Bill of Rights, as applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment and therefore as central to the development of
arguments from the American constitutional ethos. 232 This
powerful claim in Bobbitt's hands makes the ethical mode
of argument capable of justifying many personal rights of
everyman against majoritarian restrictions such as the
227. See id. at 25-38.
228. See id. at 72-92.
229. See id. at 59-73.
230. See id. at 93-119.
231. See id. at 94-95, 137-41.
232. See id. at 147-56.
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rights to reproduction and familial development 233 and the
clause right to the separation of religion and
establishment 234
public schools.
Bobbitt does not provide the same kind of detailed map
for constitutional functions as for constitutional arguments.
But his discussion of constitutional functions is sufficient to
indicate that the values of power, time and everyman are
present as well in the functions that help guide constitutional argument. The primary function of judicial review is
"making constitutional doctrine, and deciding cases by
means of those doctrines,"235 and this function is served by
all six methods of constitutional argument, which in the
aggregate implicate the three fundamental constitutional
values. But in some cases, Bobbitt argues, the courts are
less concerned with making and applying doctrine and more
236
concerned with serving other constitutional functions.
These functions include "legitimating" particular exercises
of government power, 237 "checking" abusive uses of government power, 238 "referring" non-justiciable issues to other
branches of government, 239 "cueing" other branches of government to take seriously their constitutional obligations
as, for example, might be said of some of the Supreme
Court's federalism decisions that have invalidated
Congressional acts without establishing clear doctrinal
guidelines, 240 and finally, the "expressive function" of

233. See id. at 93-167 (developing ethical arguments to support the Supreme
Court's decisions in cases like Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, and Moore
v. City of East Cleveland).

234. See id. at 196-219.
235. Id. at 176.
236. See id. at 176-77, 190-95.
237. This function may be foremost when the Court feels a need to
legitimate the national government's exercise of the war and foreign affairs
powers. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
238. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
239. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 29-33

(1962); Alexander M. Bickel, The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
240. Bobbitt in 1982 described National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976), as an instance of the cueing function at work. See BOBBITT, supra
note 6, at 191-95. One might consider the Court's recent federalism decisions in

Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529
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characterizing the kind of society and its rules that America
is or is becoming. 241 Serving these other functions, of
course, will involve significant exercise of judicial power as
well as respect for other government powers. Moreover, to
the extent that the expressive function is often well-served
by ethical arguments, 242 the values of everyman are
especially implicated by the expressive function as well as
the doctrinal function.
The variable use of six different methods of argument,
including the prudential method, may suggest that
Bobbitt's theory is close to pragmatism and that a
Bobbittian judge would be or could be free to operate like an
open-ended or liberal pragmatist. On the other hand, a
judge who takes seriously all the possibilities in Bobbitt's
theory of different methods and constitutional functions
would be more constrained than pragmatic theory
prescribes and would often be committed to arguments from
authorities that involve time and everyman. Also, Bobbitt's
account of the prudential mode, as practiced by the
Supreme Court and as argued for by Alexander Bickel, emphasizes its negative or passive use in justifying the refusal
to decide a "non-justiciable" cases. 243 If Bobbitt is a
pragmatist, his theory is a complex and unique one.
244
Ronald Dworkin's theory of constitutional "integrity
or "the moral reading" of the constitution 245 is also a threedimensional theory. Dworkin's theory at times has been
misunderstood or mischaracterized as a kind of "foundational" theory that privileges liberalism over democracy or
as a theory that privileges unencumbered reasoning from
moral principles over arguments that are grounded in constitutional authorities. 246 This type of criticism usually

U.S. 598 (2000), as similar instances of the cueing function in that they
certainly warn Congress to respect the federal allocation of powers while
providing rather fuzzy doctrinal guidelines for future decisions.
241. See BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 177, 184-89, 209-23.
242. Cf. id. at 223 ("I would not like to tie ethical argument and the
expressive function too closely.").
243. See id. at 59-73.
244. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 17, at 176-275, 355-99.
245. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 17, at 1-38.

246. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supranote 19, at 11-12; ELY, supra note 15, at 58;
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seems to be aimed at only a part of Dworkin's work on constitutional law, and fails to appreciate the continuity and
interrelationships between different statements of his theory that have appeared over the past 25 years. 247 When
Dworkin's oeuvre is considered as a whole, 248 his theory
may be seen to constitute a nuanced integration of constitutional authorities and moral principles or, in other words, a
very thorough integration of power, time, and everyman.
Dworkin begins by taking seriously the abstract
language in the phrases of the constitutional text that
usually frame controversial constitutional litigation. 249 This
language constitutes the foundational rules for American
government and also the "semantic intentions" of the
Framers, and this language embodies general moral principles such as the First Amendment prohibitions against
government abridging speech or the free exercise of religion
and the Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions against
government denying individuals due process or equal protection. These principles, however, are relatively abstract
"concepts" of appropriate relationships between government
and individuals and they generate more specific or concrete
''competing conceptions;" some kind of interpretation or
choice between the competing conceptions is necessary to
apply the abstract phrases of constitutional text to
particular cases. 250 For instance, does the concept "equal
Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A
Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1269 (1997).
247. One senses that this kind of criticism of Ronald Dworkin's
constitutional theory is often motivated by some insistent eagerness in the critic
to make the case for his preferred theory of constitutional law by dramatically
distancing or separating his own theory from Dworkin's. See, e.g., sources cited
supra note 246. This, of course, may not be unsurprising when a scholar's desire
to advocate legal change is combined, as it often is, with the desire for
recognition of the originality of one's work-a situation that plagues many of us
in legal scholarship.
248. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 17; DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW,

supra note 17; Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 60; Dworkin, The Arduous
Virtue of Fidelity, supra note 54.
249. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 17, at 7-12; Dworkin, Hard
Cases, supra note 60, at 1082-85; Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity,
supra note 54, at 1252-56.
250. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 17, at 70-72, 90-96; Dworkin,
Hard Cases, supra note 60, at 1070, 1075-77.
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protection of the laws" mean the more concrete conception
of an anti-caste principle or a color-blind principle in the
case of affirmative action?
In Dworkin's view, the interpretation of abstract language like "equal protection of the laws" must necessarily
be a "constructive interpretation" rather than the decoding
of an objective or consensus truth as is the case with the
Morse Code. 251 The basic procedure for constructive
interpretation of law is the articulation of moral principles
that are embedded in the constitutional authorities of text,
history and precedent, that establish a coherence or "integrity" among these authorities, and that make constitutional
'252
law as it appears in the sources "the best it can be.
Constitutional interpretation, in other words, relies on
embedded moral principles that satisfy two criteria: a standard of satisfactory "fit" with existing constitutional sources
or authorities, and a standard of "justification" that makes
constitutional law the best it can be. 253 Of course, in difficult cases advocates will often claim that different moral
principles are embedded in the constitutional authorities
and would serve to make constitutional law "the best it can
be." Constitutional interpretation is thus "pervasively
contestable, ' 254 and in hard cases a judge must come to her
own decision about which principles provide the best fit and
best justification for the decision. She will be aided in this
decision, however, by the relative "weights" that society and
the legal profession have given to the competing sets of
principles in previous instances of adjudication and legislation.255 So even in the deepest throes of moral choice, the
Dworkinian judge, Hercules or Hercula, can make connections to the value of time as well as everyman.
This theory of constitutional integrity or moral reading
clearly recognizes power. It takes seriously the power of the
Framers, who established the abstract language in the

251. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 17, at 49-53. See also id. at 4586.
252. See id. at 225-58, 410-13; Dworkin, Hard Cases, supranote 60.
253. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 17, at 225-28.
254. Id. at 411.
255. See Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 38-39,
42 (1967).
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constitutional text, and it recognizes the power of both the
judiciary and the elected branches of government, for if a
claim of constitutional right against the government cannot
be established by embedded principles that fit and justify
constitutional sources, the power of the majority should
prevail. 256 This theory's respect for the fit of moral principles with precedents and other constitutional sources
commits the theory to time as well, and its reliance upon
embedded moral principles clearly serves the values of
everyman. Moreover, Dworkin has emphasized in his recent
writing that his theory of constitutional integrity encompasses both "conservative" and "liberal" moral readings of
constitutional sources. 257 For example, at the time of Roe v.
Wade,258 conservative jurists might plausibly have
259
perceived the privacy principle of Griswold v. Connecticut
to protect persons from government interventions only in
private places, under a Fourth Amendment reading of
Griswold, and not to protect the intimate decisions 26of0
women concerning reproduction as the Roe majority did.
Or, in affirmative action cases, conservatives might perceive the best embedded moral principle of equal protection
to be a requirement of "color-blind" government decisions,
which would ban most or all affirmative action programs,
while liberals perceive the best embedded principle to be
the anti-caste principle that proscribes regulations which
disadvantage racial minorities but would allow the
constitutionality of genuine affirmative action programs. 261
One may wonder whether there are many practical
differences between Philip Bobbitt's practice-based theory
and Ronald Dworkin's theory of constitutional integrity in
view of the relatively comprehensive scope of the two theories and each theory's apparent ability to fit, explain and

256. See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 60, at 1061.
257. See DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 17, at 2-3, 7-8, 37-38.
258. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
259. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
260. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); John Hart
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973).
261. See, e.g., DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 17, at 379-97; supra text
accompanying notes 59-67.
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justify most leading constitutional precedents. Indeed,
Bobbitt's methods might be viewed as specific pathways to
follow in the search for the embedded moral principles that
best fit constitutional authorities and best justify constitutional decisions in Dworkin's theory.
Bobbitt nonetheless goes to some length to distinguish
his mode of "ethical argument" from "moral arguments,"
and he argues against the latter kind of argument as
unlawerly and non-objective. 262 In addition, Bobbitt's theory
on its face appears to be more eclectic and more open to
pragmatic or prudential arguments than Dworkin's theory
is. In the end, however, the major difference between these
theories may be one of attitude, nuance and general
perspective. Bobbitt's theory appears more "realist" or "lawyer-like" in its emphasis on trying to describe legal
practices as they really are. 263 Dworkin's theory seems more
"idealist" or "philosophical" in its emphasis on justifying
constitutional law as the best it can be and providing a
philosophical justification for what judges do rather than
describing the literal performance of judges. 264 While differences in attitude, nuance and perspective may not dictate
different results in many cases, they still may be of significance in affecting judicial choices in some important decisions. The constitutional values of time and everyman are
firmly embodied in Dworkin's concepts of embedded moral
principles and constitutional integrity, but these values are
central to only a few of Bobbitt's modes of argument (time
in doctrinal, historical, and ethical arguments, and everyman in ethical argument 265 ). This difference could lead
judges working with Bobbitt's theory to slight the values of
time or everyman in particular cases when they consider
themselves free to follow one of the other modes of constitutional argument.

262. See BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 94-95, 137-41.

263. Interestingly, Philip Bobbitt's new book on international relations, The
Shield of Achilles, is grounded in the "realist" or 'Machiavellian" school of
political science and international relations. See PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF
ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY (2002).

264. See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 60, at 1058-60, 1063-65.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 225-34.
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VI. CHOOSING A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

This section has two purposes. The first is to clarify
some relationships between different constitutional theories
and different conceptions of the rule of law and democracy.
The second is to offer reasons for choosing a three-dimensional theory as the best theory of constitutional law.
Readers, of course, should be alert to the possibility that my
interest in advocating a particular type of constitutional
theory may taint my prior analysis of the relationships
between different theories, democracy, and the rule of law.
A. Clarifications
In general, the power theories of constitutional law rest
on relatively narrow conceptions of the rule of law and
democracy. For strict originalist theories, which attempt to
integrate the power of the Framers with contemporary
governmental power, 266 the idea of "the rule of law" consists
of relatively clear, specific and fixed rules that allegedly can
provide clarity and stability in constitutional law. Such
rules are important because they would, on the account of
the strict originalists, impede or prohibit judicial value
choices in constitutional law and leave maximum discretion
to the elected branches of government to pursue majoritarian policies. For strict originalists, then, the idea of
democracy is closely associated with majority voting for and
by elected representatives. Individuals only have rights
against the majority will of the present government if they
can find support for these rights "clearly" in the eighteenth
and nineteenth century meanings of particular constitutional provisions.
Open-ended pragmatic theories of constitutional law
appear on their face to grant more discretionary power to
judges, 267 but these theories too rest on relatively narrow
conceptions of the rule of law and democracy. In the pragmatic perspective, any rule of law concern is satisfied by
resolving constitutional disputes by means of the wisdom or
prudence of politically-selected, law-trained judges who

266. See supratext accompanying notes 119-43.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 144-51.
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presumably should, as a result of their experiences, have
respect for (pragmatically) following rules and precedents in
most cases as well as for the power of the elected branches
of government. 268 The conception of democracy in openended pragmatic theories is thus largely majoritarian in nature, although it includes assisting the elected branches of
government by the wise judgments and power of politicallyselected legal experts.
Two-dimensional theories of constitutional law, those of
power and time or power and everyman, rest on more
complex conceptions of the rule of law and democracy,
which have something of an intermediate scope by comparison to other theories. Common law and complex originalist
theories, which attempt to integrate the constitutional
values of power and time, recognize a broader power of
judges to impose constitutional constraints on elected
branches of government as long as judges wield their expertise in interpreting constitutional materials. 269 In these
theories, the rule of law is less definite, more committed to
decisions of the prior generations of the American people,
and more flexible with regard to current social conditions
than strict originalism. The commitment of common law
and complex originalist theories to the decisions of prior
generations of the American people distinguishes these
theories from open-ended pragmatism as well. The underlying conceptions of democracy embodied in these theories
are similarly richer, more historical and more inclined to
recognize strong individual rights against government than
the theories of strict originalism and open-ended pragmatism.
The two-dimensional theories that integrate power and
everyman, by comparison, discount the interpretive expertise of judges and would replace this with political or moral
judgments by politically-selected judges that promote the
values of all persons in balance with the purportedly
majoritarian decisions of elected officials.270 This makes for
a rule of law notion that is similar that of open-ended
pragmatism: the rule of law consists of resolving constitu-

268. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 12, at 1337-38.
269. See supratext accompanying notes 152-86.
270. See supratext accompanying notes 187-209.
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tional disputes by relying on politically-selected judges as
experts-although in this case judges become experts in the
values of everyman rather than empirical studies and
policy. These theories are also based on rich, complex conceptions of democracy, for they point towards representing
the values of everyman as an essential feature of democratic government. They would do this by means of wise
political judgments by politically-selected judges in liberal
pragmatic theories,2 7 1 or candid moral judgments by politiin the moral theories of constitutional
cally-selected judges
27 2
decisionmaking.
The three-dimensional theories of Ely, Bobbitt and
Dworkin that integrate power, time and everyman 273 rest
on the broadest conceptions of the rule of law and democracy. The complexity of integrating these fundamental
values of constitutional law means that to many observers
or judges such a process is likely to produce in American
constitutional law more indefiniteness than is tolerable, or
more demands for "Herculean" judgments than is possible.
But why is indefiniteness about predictions of how difficult
constitutional cases will be decided so intolerable? Constitutional law is not contract law in the sense of a system of
rules upon which private decision-makers frequently rely,
and while government efficiency is a value, so are the
values of everyman as recognized in American history. In
addition, three dimensional- theories may be viewed as
philosophical justifications for what judges in fact accomplish by cruder or more practical measures, such as relying
on their instincts together with the conventional methods of
legal interpretation. 274 Furthermore, three-dimensional
theories are grounded in a relatively comprehensive conception of American democracy: that democracy consists not
only of majoritarian decisions by elected officials but also of
the individual rights of everyman as these rights have been
shaped over the course of American history by constitu-

271. See, e.g., PERETTI, supra note 31; SEIDMAN, supra note 8.
272. See, e.g., EISGRUBER, supranote 3; PERRY, supra note
273. See supra text accompanying notes 210-65.
274. See Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 60, at
(describing how a "philosophical judge" of "superhuman skill,
and acumen" might construct his or her theories of legislative
principles).

16.
1083, 1083-1101
learning, patience
purpose and legal
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tional developments, constitutional precedents and our
constitutional ethos. These considerations suggest that the
rich, complex conceptions of democracy and rule of law in
which three-dimensional theories are grounded may make
these theories the most attractive.
B. Towards Three-DimensionalTheory
There are three reasons for choosing a three-dimensional theory, especially a theory like Bobbitt's or
Dworkin's, as a preferred theory of constitutional law. First,
such a theory would encompass the three attractive
fundamental constitutional values: the need to balance
different kinds of power that exist in our complex society,
the need to take account of our constitutional inheritance
from prior generations of Americans and public officials,
and the need to take account of the values and interests of
all persons in the context of majoritarian decision-making
by legislatures and executive officials. 275 Second, threedimensional theories, because of their relatively comprehensive view of constitutional decision-making, promise to
provide the best fit of any constitutional theory with
existing constitutional law and practices, and this should be
an attractive feature to any practicing judge or lawyer.
Third, if judges are to check the excesses of elected officials,
as called for by American constitutional democracy, obligating judges to rely upon the values embedded in constitutional authorities (the value of time) and embedded values
that have moral qualities that serve the rights of all
persons (the value of everyman) would appear to be the best
way to restrain judges from imposing their own values upon
elected officials. As we have seen, one and two-dimensional
theories grant various kinds of discretion to judges that
allow considerable room for judges to rely on their own
values, expressly or tacitly, to limit the values expressed by
the actions of elected officials. 276 But obligating judges to
concentrate on both the values of everyman and the values
of constitutional time would seem to be good device for
displacing any judicial concern with personal values. In
summary, three-dimensional constitutional theories pro-

275. See supra Parts I-IL.
276. See supra Part V.A-C.
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mote good substantive values, the value of fit, and certain
procedural qualities that should make them a preferred
type of theory.
Currently, the best candidates for a three-dimensional
theory of constitutional law would appear to be those of
John Hart Ely, Philip Bobbitt, and Ronald Dworkin. As I
have suggested, Ely's theory is less comprehensive in two
related ways: it denies certain values of everyman and thus
has only a limited fit with modern constitutional law. 277 The
choice between Bobbitt's and Dworkin's more comprehensive theories, in the end, may come down to a choice
between "realism" (doing things the way they have been
done) and "idealism" (making constitutional law the best it
can be within the constraint of existing authorities). 278 In
my view, the aspirations and aesthetics of idealism are
preferable to Machiavellian realism. 279 But perhaps
constitutional law, especially if practiced in a three-dimensional way, would benefit in the long run from a continuing
vigorous dialogue or even oscillation between idealism and
realism.
Of course, a second-best choice of constitutional theory
should also be considered, for theories like Bobbitt's and
Dworkin's may be "too theoretical" for a practical profession. In this view, why not choose common law
constitutionalism? 28 0 Or a moderate form of complex
originalism, such as either Akhil Amar's "holistic" approach 281 or Jed Rubenfeld's "paradigm" approach 28 2 to constitutional intepretation? These two-dimensional theories

277. See supra text accompanying notes 212-15.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 262-65.
279. Following Pierre Schlag, I understand aesthetics to include the forms
and images one deploys to comprehend social practices like law, and as evident
in this article, my preference (in Schlag's terms) is for the "aesthetics of energy"
and "aesthetics of perspectivism" (or pluralism) rather than the "aesthetics of
the grid" (or legal order) and "disassociative aesthetics" (or relativism and
postmodernism). See Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 1047 (2002). Strict originalists, of course, may prefer the aesthetics of
the grid and pragmatists may prefer disassociative aesthetics. So it goes.
280. See Strauss, supra note 7; supra text accompanying notes 152-65.
281. See AMAR, supra note 19; Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 178; supra
text accompanying notes 177-81.
282. See RUBENFELD, supra note 2; supra text accompanying notes 182-86.
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comfortably espouse the lawyer's traditional qualities of
respecting both power and time. But at the same time, the
flexibility of these theories in interpreting abstract constitutional provisions in ways that encompass America's full
constitutional history would appear to generate or at least
permit significant constitutional recognition of the values of
everyman. 28 3 Some kind of power and time theory would
seem to make a good second-best choice of constitutional
theory.

283. See, for example, the "liberal surprises" from the Supreme Court in the
summer of 2003 that seem to come largely from the "common law" justices on
the Supreme Court, or, in other words, the "swing" and "moderate" justices who
often are unfairly characterized or bashed as "liberals." Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding individualized affirmative action admissions
programs); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating anti-sodomy
laws); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (finding ineffective assistance of
counsel where counsel failed to conduct more than a superficial investigation of
mitigating evidence relating to the defendant's personal history in a death
penalty case).

